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#### The aff must be a restriction on the volume of oil that is extracted- not the location

EIA No Date [EIA Glossary “Production” http://www.eia.gov/tools/glossary/index.cfm]

Production, crude oil: The volumes of crude oil that are extracted from oil reservoirs. These volumes are determined through measurement of the volumes delivered from lease storage tanks or at the point of custody transfer, with adjustment for (1) net differences between opening and closing lease inventories and (2) basic sediment and water. Crude oil used on the lease is considered production.

#### Our interp is preferable

#### Key to preserving limits- the topic can get huge if anything relating to energy production is topical- there are millions of restrictions that could indirectly prevent us from getting oil out of the ground

#### EIA is the most predictable and precise definition- defining topic actor means our interpretation should be preferred as the least arbitrary- requiring the restriction to be on production is the most grammatical interp of the resolution as well

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#### Fiscal cliff deal now- insiders agree- PC is key to maintain compromise- failure collapses the economy

Hall and Lightman 11-8 [Kevin G. Hall and David Lightman 11-8-2012 Kansas City Star “Put up or shut up time for Congress, Obama on fiscal cliff” http://www.kansascity.com/2012/11/08/3907178/put-up-or-shut-up-time-for-congress.html]

Lawmakers sent mixed signals this week about serious negotiations vs. driving briefly off the cliff’s edge before settling.¶ Tuesday’s election results kept the same power players in place, the same group that went to that edge repeatedly during budget and debt ceiling negotiations over the last two years.¶ House Speaker John Boehner, R-Ohio, said Wednesday that he was ready to “find the common ground that has eluded us” and talk to Democrats, even about raising revenue.¶ Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, D-Nev., also talked conciliation, promising not to draw “any lines in the sand.”¶ The election’s status quo result – the same president, Republicans still controlling the House of Representatives and Democrats remaining in charge of the Senate – suggests the public “is obviously saying work together, meet halfway, come together,” said Sen. Charles Schumer, D-N.Y., usually a fierce partisan.¶ The rank and file may feel less sanguine. The election solidified conservatives’ hold on the House and liberals’ strength in the Senate, suggesting any deal could have a difficult time winning approval.¶ The key, said Republicans, is for President Barack Obama to take the lead and offer a detailed plan.¶ “The only thing that’s changed since the election is that the president is not campaigning,” said Don Stewart, spokesman for Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky.¶ Ultimately, say insiders, the doomsday alternative to inaction will force a deal. The nonpartisan Congressional Budget Office said in a report Thursday that failing to act on the fiscal-cliff components could shave half a percentage point off of growth in the first half of 2013, raising the jobless rate to 9.1 percent and probably would trigger another recession. The CBO also said that addressing the components of the fiscal cliff results in a 3 or 4 percentage point swing between contraction and growth.

#### Huge backlash to drilling in ANWR

NRDC 2011 [National Resources Defense Council, 12/19/2011, “Arctic Wildlife Refuge: Why Trash an American Treasure for a Tiny Percentage of Our Oil Needs?” http://www.nrdc.org/land/wilderness/arctic.asp]

Congress has received hundreds of thousands of emails, faxes and phone calls from citizens opposed to drilling in the Arctic Refuge, an outpouring that has helped make the difference. And polls have consistently shown that a majority of Americans oppose drilling, even in the face of high gas prices and misleading claims from oil interests. A June 2008 poll by the research firm Belden Russonello & Stewart found that 55 percent of the American public supports continued protection for the Arctic Refuge, and only 35 percent of Americans believe that allowing oil companies to drill in the refuge would result in lower gas prices for American consumers.

#### Fiscal Cliff failure destroys Middle East security – impact is war

Hutchison 9/21 U.S. Senator from the great state of Texas, 9/21/2012

(Kay Bailey, “A Looming Threat to National Security,” States News Service, Lexis)

Despite warnings of the dire consequences, America is teetering at the edge of a fiscal cliff, with January 1st, 2013 as the tipping point. On that date, unless Congress and the White House can reach agreement on how to cut the federal deficit, all taxpayers will be hit with higher taxes and deep cuts - called "sequestration" - will occur in almost all government spending, disrupting our already weak economy and putting our national security at risk. According to the House Armed Services Committee, if sequestration goes into effect, it would put us on course for more than $1 trillion in defense cuts over the next 10 years. What would that mean? A huge hit to our military personnel and their families; devastating cuts in funding for critical military equipment and supplies for our soldiers; and a potentially catastrophic blow to our national defense and security capabilities in a time of increasing violence and danger. All Americans feel a debt of gratitude to our men and women who serve in uniform. But Texas in particular has a culture that not only reveres the commitment and sacrifice they make to protect our freedom, we send a disproportionate number of our sons and daughters to serve. The burden is not borne solely by those who continue to answer the call of duty, but by their families as well, as they endure separation and the anxiety of a loved one going off to war. These Americans have made tremendous sacrifices. They deserve better than to face threats to their financial security and increased risks to their loved ones in uniform, purely for political gamesmanship. Sequestration would also place an additional burden on our economy. In the industries that support national defense, as many as 1 million skilled workers could be laid off. With 43 straight months of unemployment above 8 percent, it is beyond comprehension to add a virtual army to the 23 million Americans who are already out of work or under-employed. Government and private economic forecasters warn that sequestration will push the country back into recession next year. The recent murder of our Ambassador to Libya and members of his staff, attacks on US embassies and consulates and continued riots across the Middle East and North Africa are stark reminders that great portions of the world remain volatile and hostile to the US. We have the mantle of responsibility that being the world's lone super-power brings. In the absence of U.S. military leadership, upheaval in the Middle East would be worse. As any student of history can attest, instability does not confine itself to national borders. Strife that starts in one country can spread like wildfire across a region. Sequestration's cuts would reduce an additional 100,000 airmen, Marines, sailors and soldiers. That would leave us with the smallest ground force since 1940, the smallest naval fleet since 1915 and the smallest tactical fighter force in the Air Force's history. With the destabilization in the Middle East and other areas tenuous, we would be left with a crippled military, a diminished stature internationally and a loss of technological research, development and advantage - just as actors across the globe are increasing their capabilities. Sequestration can still be avoided. But that will require leadership from the President that has thus far been missing. Congress and the White House must reach a long-term agreement to reduce $1 trillion annual budget deficits, without the harsh tax increases that could stall economic growth and punish working families.

#### Those escalate

James A. Russell (managing editor of Strategic Insights, senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at NPS, From 1988-2001 held a variety of positions in the Office of the Assistant Secretary Defense for International Security Affairs, Near East South Asia, Department of Defense) Spring 2009 “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” <http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/141/StrategicStabilityReconsideredProspectsforEscalationandNuclearWarintheMiddleEast.pdf>

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance. Given these factors, it is disturbingly easy to imagine scenarios under which a conflict could quickly escalate in which the regional antagonists would consider the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. It would be a mistake to believe the nuclear taboo can somehow magically keep nuclear weapons from being used in the context of an unstable strategic framework. Systemic asymmetries between actors in fact suggest a certain increase in the probability of war – a war in which escalation could happen quickly and from a variety of participants. Once such a war starts, events would likely develop a momentum all their own and decision-making would consequently be shaped in unpredictable ways. The international community must take this possibility seriously, and muster every tool at its disposal to prevent such an outcome, which would be an unprecedented disaster for the peoples of the region, with substantial risk for the entire world.

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#### The United States Federal Government should substantially reduce restrictions on oil drilling on federal lands with the exception of ANWR.

#### The Counterplan pic’s out of restrictions on arctic drilling- that’s key to preserving biodiversity

Fiorucci 2012 [Dan Fiorucci 8-30-2012 “Shell Gets Go Ahead for Drilling in Chukchi -- With Restrictions” http://articles.ktuu.com/2012-08-30/arctic-challenger\_33506259]

Until the containment vessel can travel to the arctic, Salazar has placed restrictions on Shell's drilling. He's only given permission for the company to drill to a depth of 1300 feet. That's 4,000 feet short of the actual oil reservoir. ¶ In his opening statement today, Salazar assured the public, "Any exploratory activities will be conducted under the closest oversight -- and the most rigorous safety standards -- ever implemented in the history of the United States." ¶ Such was the diversity of opinions about what everyone agrees is an historic move in the long story of oil exploration in North America -- the move into Alaska's arctic waters. ¶ Shell predicts that if the Chukchi and Beaufort seas contain as much oil as the U.S. Geological Survey estimates they do -- 25 billion barrels -- then it will be possible to re-fill the Trans Alaska Pipeline with black gold. ¶ 25 years ago, TAPS was transporting 2 million barrels a day to the port of Valdez. These days it's transporting only about one quarter as much -- 560,000 barrels. ¶ But even if Alaska's arctic waters prove to be as rich as the U.S.G.S says, it will be a decade or more before TAPS gets re-filled. If large amounts of oil are found in the Chukchi Sea, a 400-mile-pipeline will have to be built --across the 23-million-acre National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska. And despite its industrial-sounding name, the NPR-A is, in fact, the biggest unprotected wilderness anywhere in the United States. ¶ So environmentalists worry about construction of the proposed pipeline -- which compounds their fears about drilling in arctic waters. They say that -- to this day -- there is no proven technology for containing an oil-spill in ice-choked waters. In fact, they point out, oil spill recovery -- even in waters that have no ice whatsoever -- leaves much to be desired. "The Center for Biological Diversity" contends that only 3 percent of the oil was recovered in the Gulf of Mexico oil spill of 2010 -- the largest spill in U.S. History.

#### Arctic marine ecosystems are key to broader ocean biodiversity- drilling destroys it

Cunningham 2012 [Nicholas Cunningham Policy Analyst at the American Security Project July 19, 2012 The Arctic Institute, “Offshore Oil Drilling in the U.S. Arctic, Part Three: Concerns and Recommendations” http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/07/offshore-oil-drilling-in-us-arctic-part\_19.html]

The Chukchi and Beaufort Seas are home to a diverse array of marine life, including salmon, herring, walrus, seals, whales, and waterfowl.5 Additionally, the Chukchi Sea is home to higher occurrences of benthic marine fauna relative to other Arctic habitats.6 Scientific understanding of these ecosystems and the anthropogenic effects on them, are both not yet sufficiently understood.¶ Oil drilling in the marine environment has been shown to have deleterious effects on the marine environment. Evidence suggests that noise from seismic surveys conducted during oil exploration damage acoustic animals such as whales, which can ultimately lead to fatalities if within close proximity.[ii] While whales can generally alter migration patterns to avoid such dangers, an increase in industrial activity may push whales further away from preferred habitats, potentially damaging feeding or spawning patterns. Increased tanker traffic associated with higher oil exploration and production will worsen noise pollution in the Chukchi and Beaufort Seas.¶ Additionally, the impacts of hydrocarbon releases in the marine environment have been shown to cause detrimental impacts on reproductive health, immunological and neurological functioning, as well as higher incidences of mortality for marine wildlife.[iii] Contaminants from oil and gas drilling are also believed to travel higher up on the food chain, ultimately having cascading effects for marine ecosystems. Shell’s 2012 exploration plans include drilling exploratory wells in the Chukchi Sea, where bowhead whales migrate to during the spring months.[iv]

#### Biodiversity key to survival.

Young, 10, Dr Ruth Young, PhD specialising in coastal marine ecology. 2-9-2010, “Biodiversity: what it is and why it’s important”, http://www.talkingnature.com/2010/02/biodiversity/biodiversity-what-and-why/

Different species within ecosystems fill particular roles, they all have a function, they all have a niche. They interact with each other and the physical environment to provide ecosystem services that are vital for our survival. For example plant species convert carbon dioxide (CO2) from the atmosphere and energy from the sun into useful things such as food, medicines and timber. A bee pollinating a flower (Image: ClearlyAmbiguous Flickr) Pollination carried out by insects such as bees enables the production of ⅓ of our food crops. Diverse mangrove and coral reef ecosystems provide a wide variety of habitats that are essential for many fishery species. To make it simpler for economists to comprehend the magnitude of services offered by biodiversity, a team of researchers estimated their value – it amounted to $US33 trillion per year. “By protecting biodiversity we maintain ecosystem services” Certain species play a “keystone” role in maintaining ecosystem services. Similar to the removal of a keystone from an arch, the removal of these species can result in the collapse of an ecosystem and the subsequent removal of ecosystem services. The most well known example of this occurred during the 19th century when sea otters were almost hunted to extinction by fur traders along the west coast of the USA. This led to a population explosion in the sea otters’ main source of prey, sea urchins. Because the urchins graze on kelp their booming population decimated the underwater kelp forests. This loss of habitat led to declines in local fish populations. Sea otters are a keystone species once hunted for their fur (Image: Mike Baird) Eventually a treaty protecting sea otters allowed the numbers of otters to increase which inturn controlled the urchin population, leading to the recovery of the kelp forests and fish stocks. In other cases, ecosystem services are maintained by entire functional groups, such as apex predators (See Jeremy Hance’s post at Mongabay). During the last 35 years, over fishing of large shark species along the US Atlantic coast has led to a population explosion of skates and rays. These skates and rays eat bay scallops and their out of control population has led to the closure of a century long scallop fishery. These are just two examples demonstrating how biodiversity can maintain the services that ecosystems provide for us, such as fisheries. One could argue that to maintain ecosystem services we don’t need to protect biodiversity but rather, we only need to protect the species and functional groups that fill the keystone roles. However, there are a couple of problems with this idea. First of all, for most ecosystems we don’t know which species are the keystones! Ecosystems are so complex that we are still discovering which species play vital roles in maintaining them. In some cases its groups of species not just one species that are vital for the ecosystem. Second, even if we did complete the enormous task of identifying and protecting all keystone species, what back-up plan would we have if an unforseen event (e.g. pollution or disease) led to the demise of these ‘keystone’ species? Would there be another species to save the day and take over this role? Classifying some species as ‘keystone’ implies that the others are not important. This may lead to the non-keystone species being considered ecologically worthless and subsequently over-exploited. Sometimes we may not even know which species are likely to fill the keystone roles. An example of this was discovered on Australia’s Great Barrier Reef. This research examined what would happen to a coral reef if it were over-fished. The “over-fishing” was simulated by fencing off coral bommies thereby excluding and removing fish from them for three years. By the end of the experiment, the reefs had changed from a coral to an algae dominated ecosystem – the coral became overgrown with algae. When the time came to remove the fences the researchers expected herbivorous species of fish like the parrot fish (Scarus spp.) to eat the algae and enable the reef to switch back to a coral dominated ecosystem. But, surprisingly, the shift back to coral was driven by a supposed ‘unimportant’ species – the bat fish (Platax pinnatus). The bat fish was previously thought to feed on invertebrates – small crabs and shrimp, but when offered a big patch of algae it turned into a hungry herbivore – a cow of the sea – grazing the algae in no time. So a fish previously thought to be ‘unimportant’ is actually a keystone species in the recovery of coral reefs overgrown by algae! Who knows how many other species are out there with unknown ecosystem roles! In some cases it’s easy to see who the keystone species are but in many ecosystems seemingly unimportant or redundant species are also capable of changing niches and maintaining ecosystems. The more biodiverse an ecosystem is, the more likely these species will be present and the more resilient an ecosystem is to future impacts. Presently we’re only scratching the surface of understanding the full importance of biodiversity and how it helps maintain ecosystem function. The scope of this task is immense. In the meantime, a wise insurance policy for maintaining ecosystem services would be to conserve biodiversity. In doing so, we increase the chance of maintaining our ecosystem services in the event of future impacts such as disease, invasive species and of course, climate change. This is the international year of biodiversity – a time to recognize that biodiversity makes our survival on this planet possible and that our protection of biodiversity maintains this service.

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#### Energy production is inseparable from capitalist growth—their narrow lens framing is complicit through excusing avoidance & propping up destructive forces

Clark and York ’8 Brett Clark, assistant professor of sociology at North Carolina State University, and Richard York, coeditor of Organization %26 Environment and associate professor of sociology at the University of Oregon, "Rifts and Shifts: Getting to the Root of Environmental Crises," Monthly Review, Vol. 60, Issue 06, November 2008

The development of energy production technologies provides one of the best examples of rifts and shifts, as technological fixes to energy problems create new ecological crises in the attempt to alleviate old ones. Biomass, particularly wood, has, of course, been one of the primary energy sources humans have depended on throughout their history. The development of more energy intensive processes, such as the smelting of metals, was, therefore, connected with greater pressure on forests, as trees were fed to the fires. By the time the Industrial Revolution began to emerge in Europe, vast regions of the continent had already been deforested, particularly in areas close to major sites of production, and much of this deforestation was driven by the demand for fuel. As industrialization advanced, new sources of power were desired to fuel the machines that allowed for production to take place on a growing scale. Whole forests could be devoured at an unprecedented rate, making wood ever more scarce. The tension between the desire of the capitalist owners of the new industrial technologies for expanding the accumulation of capital and the biophysical limits of Earth were apparent from the start of the Industrial Revolution. However, capitalists did not concern themselves with the internal contradictions of capitalism, except insofar as they were barriers to be transcended. Thus, efforts to achieve what we would today call sustainability were not even considered by the elite. Rather, coal (and subsequently other fossil fuels) quickly became the standard fuel of industry, temporarily sidestepping the fuelwood crisis (although forests continued to fall due to the many demands placed on them) but laying the foundations for our current global climate change crisis by dramatically increasing the emission of carbon dioxide.16 The pattern has remained similar to how it was in the early years of the Industrial Revolution. Oil was quickly added to coal as a fuel source and a variety of other energy sources were increasingly exploited. Among these was hydropower, the generation of which requires damming rivers, and thus destroying aquatic ecosystems. For example, the expansion of hydropower over the twentieth century in the U.S. Pacific Northwest was the primary force leading to the widespread depletion and extinction of salmon runs. Nuclear power was, of course, the most controversial addition to the power mix. Despite initial claims that it would provide clean, unlimited power that would be too cheap to meter, it proved to be an expensive, risky power source that produced long-lived highly radioactive waste for which safe long-term storage sites have been nearly impossible to develop. Now, in the twenty-first century, with global climate change finally being recognized by the elite as a serious problem, the proposed solutions are, as we would expect, to shift the problem from one form of energy to a new form of energy. Nuclear power, despite its drop in popularity toward the end of the last century, due to high costs and widespread public opposition, is now very much back on the agenda, with new promises of how the new nuclear plants are safer—never mind the issue of radioactive waste. We are also regaled with promises of agrofuels, ironically bringing us back to the pre-coal energy crisis. Recent scientific reports note that growing crops for agrofuel to feed cars may actually increase the carbon emitted into the atmosphere.17 But even this ignores the fact that the production of agrofuel would be based on unsustainable agricultural practices that demand massive inputs of fertilizers and would only further the depletion of soil nutrients, bringing us back to the metabolic rift that Marx originally addressed. Two recent examples of technical approaches to mitigating climate change are particularly illustrative of how technological optimism distracts us from the political-economic sources of our environmental problems. Nobel laureate Paul Crutzen, who admirably played a central role in identifying and analyzing human-generated ozone depletion in the stratosphere, recently argued that climate change can be avoided by injecting sulfur particles into the stratosphere to increase the albedo of the Earth, and thus reflect more of the sun’s energy back into space, which would counter the warming stemming from rising concentrations of greenhouse gases. Although no doubt offered sincerely and out of desperation stemming from the failure of those in power adequately to address the mounting climate crisis, the technical framing of the climate change issue makes it easy for political and business leaders to avoid addressing greenhouse gas emissions, since they can claim that technical fixes make it unnecessary to take action to preserve forests and curtail the burning of fossil fuels. Engineering the atmosphere on this scale is likely to have many far-reaching consequences (acid rain being only the most obvious), many of which have not been anticipated. In a similar vein, well-known physicist Freeman Dyson recently suggested that we can avoid global climate change by replacing one-quarter of the world’s forests with genetically engineered carbon-eating trees. The ecological consequences of such an action would likely be extraordinary. Both of these so-called solutions avoid addressing the dynamics of an economic system that is largely structured around burning fossil fuels, that must constantly renew itself on a larger scale, and that runs roughshod over nature. Often techno-solutions are proposed in a manner that suggests they are completely removed from the world as it operates. The irony is that such narrowly conceived “solutions” would only serve as a means to prop up the very forces driving ecological degradation, allowing those forces to continue to operate, as they create additional ecological rifts.18

#### The alternative is to do nothing – this solves the inevitability of capitalism

Zizek 08—Senior Research @ Institute for Social Studies-Ljubljana [Slavoj, Violence, p. 207-217

While the parallel holds, the concluding characterisation seems to fall short: the unsettling message of Seeing is not so much the indissolubility of both people and government as much the compulsive nature of democratic rituals of freedom. What happens is that by abstaining from voting, people effectively dissolve the government-not only in the limited sense of overthrowing the existing government, but more radically. Why is the government thrown into such a panic by the voters' abstention? It is compelled to confront the fact that it exists, that it exerts power, only insofar as it is accepted as such by its subjects-accepted even in the mode of rejection. The voters' abstention goes further than the intra-political negation, the vote of no confidence: it rejects the very frame of decision. In psychoanalytic terms, the voters' abstention is something like the psychotic Verwerfung (foreclosure, rejection/repudiation), which is a more radical move than repression (Verdrangung). According to Freud, the repressed is intellectually accepted by the subject, since it is named, and at the same time is negated because the subject refuses to recognise it, refuses to recognise him or herself in it. In contrast to this, foreclosure rejects the term from the symbolic tout court. To circumscribe the contours of this radical rejection, one is tempted to evoke Badiou's provocative thesis: "It is better to do nothing than to contribute to the invention of formal ways of rendering visible that which Empire already recognizes as existent.''6 Better to do nothing than to engage in localised acts the ultimate function of which is to make the system run more smoothly (acts such as providing space for the multitude of new subjectivities). The threat today is not passivity, but pseudoactivity, the urge to "be active," to "participate," to mask the nothingness of what goes on. People intervene all the time, "do something"; academics participate in meaningless debates, and so on. The truly difficult thing is to step back, to withdraw. Those in power often prefer even a "critical" participation, a dialogue, to silence-just to engage us in "dialogue," to make sure our ominous passivity is broken. The voters' abstention is thus a true political act: it forcefully confronts us with the vacuity of today's democracies.If one means by violence a radical upheaval of the basic social relations, then, crazy and tasteless as it may sound, the problem with historical monsters who slaughtered millions was that they were not violent enough. Sometimes doing nothing is the most violent thing to do.

# Economy Advantage

#### Drilling here makes no dent in unemployment

Krugman 2012 [Paul Krugman Nobel Prize Economist March 15, 2012, New York Times, “Natural Born Drillers” http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/opinion/krugman-natural-born-drillers.html?\_r=1,%208/4/12]

Meanwhile, what about jobs? I have to admit that I started laughing when I saw The Wall Street Journal offering North Dakota as a role model. Yes, the oil boom there has pushed unemployment down to 3.2 percent, but that’s only possible because the whole state has fewer residents than metropolitan Albany — so few residents that adding a few thousand jobs in the state’s extractive sector is a really big deal. The comparable-sized fracking boom in Pennsylvania has had hardly any effect on the state’s overall employment picture, because, in the end, not that many jobs are involved.¶ And this tells us that giving the oil companies carte blanche isn’t a serious jobs program. Put it this way: Employment in oil and gas extraction has risen more than 50 percent since the middle of the last decade, but that amounts to only 70,000 jobs, around one-twentieth of 1 percent of total U.S. employment. So the idea that drill, baby, drill can cure our jobs deficit is basically a joke.

#### Oil companies don’t have to add jobs to drill more

Shogan 2011 [Cindy Shogan has been the Executive Director of the Alaska Wilderness League since 1998. Cindy received the Wilburforce Foundation's Conservation Leadership Award November 3, 2011 US News and World Report “Drilling in ANWR Will Not Solve Our National Energy Crisis” http://www.usnews.com/debate-club/is-it-time-to-drill-in-the-arctic-refuge/drilling-in-anwr-will-not-solve-our-national-energy-crisis]

Any claims about job growth from domestic drilling are met with this stark reality: The top five largest oil companies have actually cut their work force by 11,200 employees in the past five years, despite the fact that this country is producing more oil and gas now than at any other time in our history. And, they are making record profits.

#### Their jobs numbers are inflated

Goodell 2012 [Jeff Goodell 9-14-2012 Rolling Stone Magazine “Mitt Romney's Disastrous Energy Plan” http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/mitt-romneys-disastrous-energy-plan-20120914]

During his speech in New Mexico, Romney claimed that expanding oil and gas production would create 3 million new jobs, including 1 million in manufacturing. "Job creation numbers are always speculative," says Sean Sweeney, head of the Global Labor Institute at Cornell University. "With Romney, it's all about voodoo accounting." In fact, the jobs-creation numbers being tossed around by Republicans are pure fantasy. Romney supporter Carly Fiorina recently claimed on Meet the Press that completing the Keystone pipeline would create "over a million jobs." But even TransCanada, the company that will build the pipeline, estimates that it will create only 6,500 jobs a year.

#### U.S. economy improving even more than experts predicted – jobs, manufacturing, consumer confidence

Steven C. Johnson and Lucy Hornby, “GLOBAL ECONOMY-Asian factories, U.S. jobs show improvement,” Reuters, November 1, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/11/01/global-economy-pmis-idUSL5E8M19M120121101>, accessed 11-1-2012.

Private U.S. firms¶ stepped up hiring last month and factories showed modest¶ improvement, surveys showed Thursday, while Asia's large¶ economies started to pick up after a year of slower growth.¶ The jury was out on whether the data signalled sustained¶ improvement in the fragile global economy, though analysts said¶ strength in the United States and China, the world's two biggest¶ economies, was essential to overall economic well-being.¶ That's particularly so at a time when a debt crisis in the¶ 17-country euro zone has plunged several countries in the region¶ into recession. Reports on major euro zone countries are due on¶ Friday and expected to show continued economic contraction.¶ But the picture appeared to be brightening elsewhere.¶ U.S. companies added 158,000 jobs in October, data from¶ payrolls processor ADP showed on Thursday, far more than the¶ 135,000 predicted in a Reuters poll. ¶ Separate data showed the number of Americans filing for¶ first-time jobless benefits fell last week while U.S. consumer¶ confidence jumped to a four-year high. ¶ In other reports, overall sales at major U.S. retail chain¶ stores, excluding at drugstores, rose 4.7 percent in Octoer,¶ compared with analysts' expectations for a 4.3 percent increase¶ at the 17 chains tracked by Thomson Reuters I/B/E/S. ¶ But some U.S. retailers expect the massive storm that hit the¶ U.S. East Coast this week to hurt sales in November, while¶ overall holiday sales should still show the slow growth that was¶ forecast before Sandy hit. ¶ The data was welcomed by the U.S. stock market, which rose¶ on the second day since it reopened following a massive storm¶ that battered the U.S. Northeast earlier this week.¶ The data "are encouraging," said David Sloan, economist at¶ 4Cast Ltd in New York. "There shouldn't be any distortions from¶ the hurricane yet. It seems with the ADP message there is some¶ evidence of labor market improvement. It is not totally¶ convincing yet but overall the message is positive." ¶ The picture was more mixed among U.S. factories. The¶ Institute for Supply Management said the pace of growth picked¶ up slightly in the sector, with its index rising to a five-month¶ peak of 51.7. But the pace of hiring in the sector slowed.¶ A separate report from data firm Markit showed the slowest¶ pace of growth in 37 months, the result of reduced demand for¶ U.S. goods overseas.¶ "It looks like manufacturing has stopped deteriorating. It's¶ weak growth but it's growth," said Christopher Low, chief¶ economist at FTN Financial.¶ In Brazil, manufacturing expanded for the first time since¶ March, according to the HSBC Purchasing Managers' Index,¶ boosting hopes for economic improvement in the fourth quarter.

#### Econ collapse doesn’t cause war – prefer our studies

Samuel Bazzi (Department of Economics at University of California San Diego) and Christopher Blattman (assistant professor of political science and economics at Yale University) November 2011 “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices” <http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4>

VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately, however, the fact that commodity price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock. The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability. Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these. Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate, the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20

# Venezuela (really Iran)

#### Diplomacy outweighs – both sides want peace

Stratfor March 8, 2012 “Signs of U.S.-Iranian Truce” http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/signs-us-iranian-truce

By continuing to advocate a diplomatic approach, Obama has risked the domestic political fallout of being seen as soft on Iran. However, his carefully phrased message appears to have made an impression on the Iranian leadership at a crucial geopolitical juncture. Over the past week, there has been a great deal of bluster in the international media over a potential military strike against Iran. The most common narrative has portrayed Israel as having no choice but to strike Iran imminently and independently if the United States continues to stall while Iran comes dangerously close to achieving nuclear weapons capability. This narrative has resonated with the audience of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, the ardently pro-Israel lobby that hosted Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu at its annual conference this past week, and opposition contenders in the U.S. presidential race have frequently used it to condemn the Obama administration's foreign policy toward Iran. Despite the political pressures he was facing at home over the question of U.S. support for Israel against Iran, Obama was exceedingly cautious in responding to the war rhetoric. While maintaining that the military option remained viable, he said in a March 4 speech that "now is not the time for bluster," and that "loose talk of war" only works to Iran's advantage by driving up oil prices, providing it with more revenue to develop its nuclear program. Indeed, Khamenei has even recently articulated that the strength of Iran's foreign policy is that it has to do very little to disturb the oil markets and can rely simply on "threats against threats" to maintain its advantage over its adversaries. Obama also reiterated that more time is needed to allow pressure to sink in from the sanctions effort, and he stressed that a diplomatic path is the most appropriate way forward. The two leaders' recent speeches come after a quiet U.S. attempt to restart backchannel negotiations with Iran in early January with a letter from Obama requesting direct talks with Tehran. Shortly thereafter, the United States announced it would delay joint military exercises with Israel, and Iran, in turn, indefinitely postponed exercises in the Strait of Hormuz. Khamenei's positive reaction to Obama's statements over the past week represents another likely indicator that Iran is interested in negotiating with the United States. The supreme leader's statements come as Iran prepares to re-enter negotiations over its nuclear program with the P-5+1 group in Turkey in April. Neither side appears ready for a strategic accommodation, but as Iran tries to regain room to maneuver from sanctions and Obama tries to lower military tensions as he seeks re-election, there are signs of a fragile truce.

#### No Iran heg – they are in retreat now

Abdulkhaleq Abdullah (professor of political science at Emirates University. He holds a PhD in Political science from Georgetown University) January 31, 2012 “Iran is running out of steam” http://gulfnews.com/opinions/columnists/iran-is-running-out-of-steam-1.973539

After nearly a decade of regional expansion, Iran is in for a strategic retreat. This time last year Tehran was counting its numerous regional and international gains. But from now on it seems that Iran will have to take stock of its regional and global losses, which are piling up by the day. The setbacks start at home. Politically, Iran, which is gearing up for crucial parliamentary elections due on March 2, is badly polarised. The political division in Iran is at an all-time high and is eating into its domestic legitimacy and stability. The stimulus for this political polarisation is the simmering power struggle in the confusing, multi-layered Iranian decision-making strata. The battle between the regime's hardline clerics headed by the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and the dogmatic clique around the handicapped President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad is serious and paralysing. Iran is also looking very feeble economically. The financial strain is so dire that the rial has already lost more than 40 per cent of its value. As the economy flounders, business is being held back and investments are drying up. The European Union implemented last week a total ban on the import of Iranian crude oil and blocked trade in precious metals, among other steps. These measures, in addition to the unilateral sanctions already imposed by the US and the UN, are taking a big toll on Iran's lifeblood — its oil revenue. The usually bombastic Ahmadinejad has admitted that the current sanctions are "the heaviest economic onslaught on Iran in history ... every day, all our banking and trade activities and our agreements are being monitored and blocked". The economic sanctions and boycotts are crippling and Iran can do nothing about them except make counterproductive threats.

#### No Iran prolif – if they do its slow and small

Jacques Hymans (Associate Professor, School of International Relations. University of Southern California) January 17, 2012 “Crying wolf about an Iranian nuclear bomb” http://www.thebulletin.org/web-edition/op-eds/crying-wolf-about-iranian-nuclear-bomb

Crying wolf. As strategic analysts Anthony Cordesman and Khalil al-Rodhan remind us, in the 1990s, high-level American and Israeli policymakers repeatedly warned of an Iranian bomb by the year 2000. When that did not come to pass, policymakers warned of an Iranian bomb by the year 2005. Then they said it would happen by 2010. Now the talk puts Iran's nuclear debut in the 2013-2015 time frame, if not sooner. The story of the boy who cried wolf comes to mind. This is not to deny that the Iranian regime has made some progress toward the bomb during its quarter-century of intensive nuclear efforts. Most notably, Iran has accumulated a decent amount of low-enriched uranium, enriched to about 3 percent, and a small amount enriched to around 20 percent. The country has recently embarked on a major campaign to build up its stockpile of 20 percent enriched uranium, and once this is accomplished, Iran will be well-positioned to amass a significant quantity of bomb-grade, 90 percent enriched uranium. Bottom line: Today, Iran is about halfway to its putative goal; not many countries have been able to make it even this far. That being said, however, it is crucial to recognize that the quality of Iran's nuclear workmanship has been consistently poor, so it has been able to progress at no more than a snail's pace. For instance, Iran imported powerful Pakistani P2 centrifuge models in the mid-1990s, but it was not until 2011 that it finally began using a version of them in its enrichment drive. Even now, the vast majority of the Iranian enrichment effort relies on the very inefficient Pakistani P1 centrifuge design. Indeed, in recent years -- despite the headlines about Iranian nuclear progress -- its number of working gas centrifuges has actually been declining, due to wear and tear, poor maintenance, a lack of spare parts, and impure feedstock. (As of 2005, Iran's uranium hexafluoride gas feedstock was still not much better than "garbage.") As a result, even before the devastating 2010 Stuxnet virus attacks, the Iranian program was already experiencing a "tremendous slowing down," in the words of former IAEA safeguards chief Olli Heinonen. Is it really reasonable to expect such low-quality, brittle technical infrastructure to create a single, Hiroshima-size nuclear device -- let alone a bona fide nuclear weapons arsenal?

#### No nuclear terrorism –statistically insignificant cumulative probability

John Mueller (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p, 187-190

Assigning a probability that terrorists will be able to overcome each barrier is, of course, a tricky business, and any such exercise should be regarded as rather tentative and exploratory, or perhaps simply as illustrative-though it is done all the time in cost-benefit analysis. One might begin a quantitative approach by adopting probability estimates that purposely, and heavily, bias the case in the terrorists' favor. In my view, this would take place if it is assumed that the terrorists have a fighting chance of 50 percent of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles displayed in Table 13-1, though for many barriers, probably almost all, the odds against them are surely much worse than that. Even with that generous bias, the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million, specifically 1,048,576. Indeed, the odds of surmounting even seven of the 20 hurdles at that unrealistically, even absurdly, high presumptive success rate is considerably less than one in a hundred. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds they will be able to pull off the deed drop to one in well over three billion specifically 3.486,784,401. What they would be at the (still entirely realistic) level of one in ten boggles the mind. One could also make specific estimates for each of the hurdles, but the cumulative probability statistics are likely to come out pretty much the same-or even smaller. There may be a few barriers, such as numbers 13 or absolute loyalty trump the one oftechnical competence. This would increase the chances that the bomb-making enterprise would go undetected, while at the same time decreasing the likelihood that it would be successful. However, given the monumentality of the odds confronting the would-be atomic terrorist, adjustments for such issues are scarcely likely to alter the basic conclusion. That is, if one drastically slashed the one in 3.5 billion estimate a thousandfold, the odds of success would still be one in 3.5 million. Moreover, all this focuses on the effort to deliver a single bomb. If the requirement were to deliver several, the odds become, of course, even more prohibitive. Getting away from astronomical numbers for a minute, Levi points out that even if there are only ten barriers and even if there were a wildly favorable 80 percent chance of overcoming each hurdle, the chance of final success, following the approach used here, would only be 10 percent. Faced even with such highly favorable odds at each step, notes Levi, the wouldbe atomic terrorist might well decide "that a nuclear plot is too much of a stretch to seriously try." Similarly, Jenkins calculates that even if there are only three barriers and each carried a 50/50 chance of success, the likelihood of accomplishing the full mission would only be 12.5 percent.14 Odds like that are not necessarily prohibitive, of course, but they are likely to be mind-arrestingly small if one is betting just about everything on a successful outcome. Multiple Attempts The odds considered so far are for a single attempt by a single group, and there could be multiple attempts by multiple groups, of course. Although Allison considers al-Qaeda to be "the most probable perpetrator" on the nuclear front, he is also concerned about the potential atomic exploits of other organizations such as Indonesia's Jemaah Islamiyah, Chechen gangsters, Lebanon's Hezbollah, and various doomsday cults. IS However, few, if any, groups appear to have any interest whatever in striking the United States except for al-Qaeda, an issue to be discussed more fully in the next chapter. But even setting that consideration aside, the odds would remain long even with multiple concerted attempts.16 If there were a hundred such efforts over a period of time, the chance at least one of these would be successful comes in at less than one in over 10,000 at the one chance in two level. At the far more realistic level of one chance in three, it would be about one in nearly 35 million. If there were 1,000 dedicated attempts, presumably over several decades, the chance of success would be worse than one in a thousand at the SO/50 level and one in nearly 3.5 million at the one in three level.I7 Of course, attempts in the hundreds are scarcely realistic, though one might be able to envision a dozen or so. Additionally, if there were a large number of concerted efforts, policing and protecting would presumably become easier because the aspirants would be exposing themselves repeatedly and would likely be stepping all over each other in their quest to access the right stuff. Furthermore, each foiled attempt would likely expose flaws in the defense system, holes the ...,. defenders would then plug, making subsequent efforts that much more dif• ficult. For example, when the would-be peddler of a tiny amount of pur loined highly enriched uranium was apprehended in 2006, efforts were made to trace its place of origin using nuclear forensics. IS ." Also, the difficulties for the atomic terrorists are likely to increase over time because of much enhanced protective and policing efforts by ... self-interested governments. Already, for example, by all accounts Russian nuclear materials are much more adequately secured than they were 10 or ~, .-s 15 years ago.19

#### Not an existential threat – no overreaction

John Mueller (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p. 232

From this perspective, then, rhetorical declamations insisting that terrorism poses an existential threat are profoundly misguided. And so self-destructive overreactions (like the war in Iraq) which are also encouraging to the terrorists. As Osama bin Laden crowed in 2004: It is easy for us to provoke and bait .... All that we have to do is to send two mujahidin ... to raise a piece of cloth on which is wtitten al-Qaeda in order to make the generals race there to cause America to suffer human, economic, and political losses. Our policy is one -...... of bleeding America to the point of bankruptcy. The terrorist attacks cost al-Qaeda $500,000 while the attack and its aftermath .. inflicted a cost of more than $500 billion on the United States. .... Or perhaps, it is even worse. To the extent that we "portray the terrorist nuclear threat as the thing we fear most," notes Susan Martin, "we ow--. ture the idea that this is what terrorists must do if they want to be taka. ; seriously:'48 Existential bombast can be useful for scoring political points, selling. newspapers, or securing funding for pet projects or bureaucratic expansion. However, it does so by essentially suggesting that, if the terrorists really want to destroy us, all they have to do is hit us with a terrific punch, particularly a nuclear one. Although the attack may not in itself be remotely" enough to cause the nation to cease to exist, purveyors of bombast assure the terrorists that the target country will respond by obligingly destroying itself in anguished overreaction. The suggestion, then, is that it is not ' only the most feared terrorists who are suicidal. As Sageman points out, the United States hardly faces a threat to its existence, because even a nuclear strike by terrorists "will not destroy the nation:' As things stand now, he.. adds, "only the United States could obliterate the United States:'49 Atomic terrorism may indeed be the single most serious threat to the national security of the United States. Assessed in an appropriate context, however, the likelihood that such a calamity will come about seems breathtakingly small. Sensible, cost-effective policies designed to make that probability even lower may be justified, given the damage that can be inflicted by an atomic explosion. But unjustified, obsessive alarmism about the likelihood and imminence of atomic terrorism has had policy consequences that have been costly and unnecessary. Among them are the war in Iraq and the focus on WMD that seduced federal agencies away from due preparation 5o for disasters that have actually happened, such as Hurricane Katrina. Arch-demon Zawahiri once noted that the group only became aware of biological weapons "when the enemy drew our attention to them by repeatedly expressing concerns that they can be produced simply with easily available materials;'5! By constantly suggesting that the United States will destroy itself in response to an atomic explosion, the existential bombast about a terrorist bomb that follows so naturally from decades of atomic obsession encourages the most diabolical and murderous terrorists to investigate the possibility of obtaining one. Fortunately, however, would-be atomic terrorists are exceedingly unlikely to be successful in such a quest, however intense the inspiration and encouragement they receive from the unintentional cheerleaders among their distant enemies.

# China

#### Scarcity forces cooperation

Commander Jim Cooney United States Navy 18 MAR 2005 “Chinese Oil Dependence Opportunities and Challenge” USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA432502

China's dependence on oil presents both challenges and opportunities. A secure source of oil is as important to China's national interests as it is to the United States and other industrialized nations. It would be hard to overstate Oil's importance to the current regime in China. The shared interest in the security of global trade presents opportunities for increased cooperation and understanding. China's competition with the United States in gaining influence in the Middle East is actually counter productive to her interests. Straightforward U.S. negotiations with China concerning the export of weapons technology to Iran are essential to prevent long term damage to Middle East stability and Sino/U.S. relations. Finally, the United States must maintain a credible military presence in the Western Pacific to prevent any attempts at imposing a military solution on the Spratly Island issue. Oil dependence on the part of China brings her interests more in line with the global community of capitalist states. The challenge for the United States is to emphasize how this similarity presents opportunities for cooperation while at the same time applying diplomatic pressure and maintaining deterrent forces to prevent conflict over the common need for oil.

#### No war now

Ackerman 2011 (Robert Ackerman, May 10, 2011, “War Between China, U.S. Not Likely,” http://www.afcea.org/signal/signalscape/index.php/2011/05/10/11510/)

The United States and China are not likely to go to war with each other because neither country wants it and it would run counter to both nations’ best interests. That was the conclusion of a plenary panel session hosted by former Good Morning America host David Hartman at the 2011 Joint Warfighting Conference in Virginia Beach. Adm. Timothy J. Keating, USN (Ret.), former head of the U.S. Pacific Command, noted that China actually wants the United States to remain active in the Asia-Pacific region as a hedge against any other country’s adventurism. And, most of the other countries in that region want the United States to remain active as a hedge against China. Among areas of concern for China is North Korea. Wallace “Chip” Gregson, former assistant secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, said that above all China fears instability, and a North Korean collapse or war could send millions of refugees streaming into Manchuria, which has economic problems of its own.

#### The aff ensures the Chinese pass us- cheaper oil is better for them than us

Hulbert 11/07 [Matthew Hulbert Lead Analyst at European Energy Review and consultant to a number of governments & institutional investors, most recently as Senior Research Fellow, Netherlands Institute for International Relations 11/07/2012 Forbes “Obama Ground Zero: Why Cheap American Energy Is The Death Of American Power” http://www.forbes.com/sites/matthewhulbert/2012/11/07/obama-ground-zero-why-cheap-american-energy-is-the-death-of-american-power/2/]

Sure, access to decent U.S. technology is useful for China to take back home, but the core motivation is making sure America fulfills its liquid potential. U.S. oil becomes a ‘public good’, helping China to apply market pressures across the globe. China has seen (largely at American expense) the difficulties of dependence on Middle East oil supplies. And while nobody’s fooled that OPEC supplies are the only credible way that Beijing can meet demand in the next few years, the unconventional genie is out of the international bottle. China is better placed than any other consumer in history to reshape the counters of the energy world – and North America is the instrumental key. Prolific Chinese investment in Washington’s backyard not only offers Beijing a tactical hydrocarbon hedge against traditional petro-states such as Russia, Central Asia and the Middle East as import dependency ratios increase, it’s likely to drag down oil prices internationally. Far from the Americas becoming a ‘self- contained’ unit, trading large amounts of oil between themselves (i.e. the defunct Citigroup vision), China will use the full weight of its investments and production base in the Western hemisphere against traditional producer states. The more prices ease, the more OPEC states will be staring down the barrel of popular unrest. Some regimes will fall from two digit oil prices, and for those who survive, shifting towards a volume based system might be only realistic way they can secure overseas receipts and meet rising domestic demand. Clearly that all remains to be seen, but if holds any validity whatsoever, China will have used America’s ‘oil egg’ to make an ‘OPEC omelet’. The final kicker is that Washington loses its trump ‘external security’ card along the way. As China likes to point out, they ultimately pay the bills for U.S. naval presence in the Middle East through treasury purchases. It wouldn’t seem worth the bother if we’re left with so much oil that we don’t know that to do with the stuff.¶ So, it’s a triple whammy. China uses America to forge a cheap energy world. OPEC and Russia duly respond by shifting towards volumes based strategies, the scale of which blows the U.S. out of the water as a supposed energy heavyweight of the world. With everyone going ‘unconventional’, we end up swimming in oil; Washington loses its external energy security role in the process. It’s perhaps best left to economists what that means for the international status of the dollar, but I’m guessing it’s not good. America gets played all the way to the bottom of the barrel. China gets rich. China gets powerful.

#### Aff causes Chines expansion into the Indian Ocean- kills Sino-Indian relations

Michael Richardson is a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies 7 June, 2012 “Thirst for energy driving China's foreign policy” South African Foreign Policy Initiative http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2012/thirst-energy-driving-chinas-foreign-policy

As America gains energy security in a time of cost-cutting, it will have less incentive to continue expensive military protection of maritime supply lines in increasingly contested areas such as the seas off China's coast, the oil and gas-rich Persian Gulf, and around the Middle East and Africa, prompting China to extend its own military reach into the Indian Ocean, through which so much of its imported oil and gas comes. This will heighten tensions with India. Stephen Walt, a professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government has projected the outcome of U.S.-China economic, military and energy trends in this way: "If China is like all previous great powers, including the U.S., its definition of 'vital' interests will grow as its power increases — and it will try to use its growing muscle to protect an expanding sphere of influence.

#### Sino-India war escalates over the Indian Ocean

Dan Darling is an international military markets analyst with Forecast International Inc., an aerospace and defense research company March 24, 2010 The Faster Times “Will the Indian Ocean Become the Next Arena of Great Power Conflict?” http://www.thefastertimes.com/defensespending/2010/03/24/will-the-indian-ocean-become-the-next-arena-of-great-power-conflict/

As the global balance of power continues to shift from west to east, so too do the intermingling pressures that brought about the savage conflicts of the last century. Economic expansion, shipping lanes, geography, territorial disputes and natural resources all intermingle to form a potentially toxic environment. Avoiding the missteps that led to such catastrophes as occurred in 20th Century Europe has become something of a tightrope walk for the region’s two preeminent powers, China and India. Nestled together along the Himalayas and Kunlun mountain ranges, these economically ascendant and burgeoning military powers warily eye each others moves, hoping to prevent the other from gaining some insurmountable strategic advantage. Ambitious rivals whose five-month border war in 1962 resulted in a Chinese military victory, a disputed Indian claim to a slice of territory known as Aksai Chin, a heavily militarized border (referred to as the “Line of Actual Control”) and a traumatized psyche in India where China is concerned. Ever mindful of Chinese moves, India has watched with growing anxiety as Beijing has invested in a highway linking it to Pakistan, India’s fiercest regional rival. This land route signals an attempt by Beijing to circumvent a crucial Chinese vulnerability, one that India might exploit in the even of another outbreak of hostilities between the two nations: China’s need for secure shipping lanes which ensure its vital energy supplies from the Middle East are not disrupted. With both countries proceeding to expand their military capabilities and both heavily dependent upon Middle East oil to fuel their economic growth, maneuvering for the upper hand in the Indian Ocean has intensified. The shipping lane which stretches from the Persian Gulf into the Arabian Sea and across the Indian Ocean represents the crucial transport lifeline for 80 percent of Chinese oil and 65 percent of India’s. Disadvantaged by fate of geography, Chinese energy trans-shipment must not only wind its way along this route, but then must traverse the heavily-pirated maritime choke-point, the Straits of Malacca, before then proceeding northward through the South China Sea and into home ports. The length and delicacy of such a journey makes protection of this vital shipping lifeline a fundamental security priority for China. That India, hoping to project its power throughout the Indian Ocean region, has embarked on a naval buildup only adds to the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy’s (PLAN) sense of urgency regarding sovereignty over its sea lines of communication. As a result, China has launched an effort to protect its commercial interests by undertaking a series of port development and construction projects in Sri Lanka (Hambantota), Bangladesh (Chittagong), Myanmar (Kyaukphyu), Pakistan (Gwadar) and Yemen (Mukkala). The Chinese government has assiduously cultivated warm relations with Indian Ocean nations, signing friendship pacts and providing them with large amounts of aid in a bid to build up its political capital in the region. The PLAN, meanwhile, has constructed a hardened deep-water base at Sanya, on Hainan Island in the South China Sea. The base is capable of accommodating both attack and nuclear ballistic submarines, enabling these vessels to perform patrols in the northern Indian Ocean. There is also the possibility that the PLAN may begin stationing Su-30MKK fighter/attack aircraft at bases in Myanmar, providing China with an extended airborne strike range over the Bay of Bengal. China’s expansionary efforts in the Indian Ocean region have been dubbed by the Pentagon as the “string of pearls” strategy. But while the creation and development of logistical support bases represent a necessary component of this strategy, military muscle is what underwrites its execution. With an expansionary defense budget expected to reach close to $80 billion in 2010, China is the world’s second-largest military investor and has allocated more and more to naval capabilities in the past decade. Like India, the PLAN has undertaken its own blue-water naval development. This involves the continued expansion of its submarine, destroyer and oil tanker fleets, and possibly the construction of one or more aircraft carriers. India, which for the time being arguably has a naval edge on China, is pushing forward on a ten-year, $15 billion naval acquisition plan. India’s plan to grow its blue-water capabilities includes bringing three aircraft carriers into naval service by 2015. Among some of the crucial naval platforms in Indian development are six Scorpene submarines produced under license with French technologies (plus a follow-on order for six additional submarines), six improved Project 17A (improved Shivalik-class) frigates, a nuclear-powered missile submarine (the INS Arihant), and the domestically-built Project 15 (Delhi-class) destroyers. India has also introduced Russian MiG-29K jet fighters into its aircraft fleet, intending to deploy them on the carrier INS Vikramadity – formerly the Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov – when it finally is introduced into Indian naval service. India is also taking steps to expand its air force bases in the Andaman and Nicobar island chains and plans to station Su-30MKI fighters, mid-air refuelling tankers and short- and medium-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on these island bases. This dual naval build-up has become worrisome for those with vested interests in the greater Indian Ocean. The U.S. Navy had long been entrusted with protecting shipping through the region. But with China’s rise as an economic power and status as budding rival to the U.S., Beijing is unlikely to view the American 5th Fleet as some metaphorical benevolent hand helping to protect its sea lines of communication. Indeed, American efforts to court India as a foil against China’s expanding regional influence have only added to Chinese distrust regarding Washington’s intentions. Then there is Japan, which like China relies heavily upon energy transshipment through the Indian Ocean. With a heightened PLAN presence across the same shipping lane Japan uses to ferry Middle East oil to its ports, Tokyo might opt to bolster its own naval component, thus upping the naval traffic in the region and increasing the possibility for friction. The potential for a military showdown is always strong when the interests and concerns of powerful nations intersect. But so too is the potential for partnership and pragmatism. Trade between China and India has grown exponentially since 2002; in 2008, China became India’s largest trading partner. This increased trade volume helps to weave the two countries’ economic interdependence. If the 21st Century is to become the Asian Century that some predict, then China and India must carefully balance their needs and strategies against the security concerns of the other. Avoiding hazardous missteps in the Indian Ocean would be as good a place to start as any.

#### Reducing oil dependence causes Saudi prolif, Israel Basing and China rise

Chris Black Major, US Army April 2009 “Post Oil America and a renewable energy policy leads to the abrogation of the Middle East to China” http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a530125.pdf

In the quest to reduce the consumption of oil, the US is failing to see the larger impact of a renewable energy policy. Reverse engineering over 60 years of policy, strategy, diplomacy, and military efforts to ensure the free flow and access to oil will inevitably cause a “vacuum” of American access, presence, and influence in a highly volatile region; raise the specter of larger militaries; cause an increasing need for nuclear weapons; shift security and cooperation guarantees; and disrupt the US economy and foreign policy. The implementation of a renewable energy policy begins to shift US prominence in the Persian Gulf to one dominated by China, resulting in US loss of strategic access and influence in an already volatile region. China presently practices a pure form of realpolitik in the region as they do not demand much of their energy suppliers nor care about the attendant politics of the region so long as they have a reliable oil stream. Saudi Arabia, as the largest producer of oil and keeper of the Islamic faith, will look to maintain their hold on power and will recognize the shift from the US to China and with it their security umbrella that has been provided by the US. Saudi Arabia will be happy to increase their relationship with China as that not only brings them large revenues for their national budget, it also brings a “no questions asked” policy of arms purchases and a lack of concern over Saudi’s domestic policies, their quest for nuclear weapons, or their stance towards Israel. As the US weans itself from oil it will accelerate the already occurring geopolitical shift in the Middle East from a region dominated by the United States to one that will be dominated by China. As a result of this shift, the US will lose access and influence in the region and realignments will occur among nation states leading the Saudis to grow their military and accelerate their quest for nuclear weapons. Unencumbered by the US, Saudi Arabian domestic policies will shift towards the more extreme versions of Wahhabism, leading towards an even harder stance towards Israel.

#### Saudi Prolif causes Extinction

Eric Edelman et al (Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Former Undersecretary for Defense) and Andrew Krepinevich (President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessment) and Evan Montgomery (Research Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments) February 2011 “The dangers of a nuclear Iran” http://www.csbaonline.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/2010.12.27-The-Dangers-of-a-Nuclear-Iran.pdf

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also ordered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several diªerent ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer.Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the npt since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of di⁄cult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the npt. n-player competition Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other.Multipolar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarinebased nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly,would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering a regional nuclear war. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft.

#### Only independence causes China war- we can manage them if we are engaged- leaving encourages build up

Michael Richardson is a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of South East Asian Studies 7 June, 2012 “Thirst for energy driving China's foreign policy” South African Foreign Policy Initiative http://www.safpi.org/news/article/2012/thirst-energy-driving-chinas-foreign-policy

As America gains energy security in a time of cost-cutting, it will have less incentive to continue expensive military protection of maritime supply lines in increasingly contested areas such as the seas off China's coast, the oil and gas-rich Persian Gulf, and around the Middle East and Africa, prompting China to extend its own military reach into the Indian Ocean, through which so much of its imported oil and gas comes. This will heighten tensions with India. Stephen Walt, a professor of international affairs at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government has projected the outcome of U.S.-China economic, military and energy trends in this way: "If China is like all previous great powers, including the U.S., its definition of 'vital' interests will grow as its power increases — and it will try to use its growing muscle to protect an expanding sphere of influence. "Given its dependence on raw-material imports (especially energy) and export-led growth, prudent Chinese leaders will want to make sure that no one is in a position to deny them access to the resources and markets on which their future prosperity and political stability depend. "This situation will encourage Beijing to challenge the current U.S. role in Asia. Over time, Beijing will try to convince other Asian states to abandon ties with America, and Washington will almost certainly resist these efforts. An intense security competition will follow."

## 1NR

# 1NR Venezuela

### Terrorism – Nuclear

#### This ensures terrorists won’t have the motivation

Michael A. Levi (Fellow for Science and Technology) 4/19/2007 “How Likely is a Nuclear Terrorist Attack on the United States?”, Council on Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/publication/13097/

Yet from a terrorist perspective the prospect of a fizzle or a dud might change things. Let me start by revisiting the question of terrorist aversion to failure—terrorist motivations are central to the likelihood of nuclear terrorism, and we seem to disagree on what they are. I have never asserted that terrorists will not attempt anything but “foolproof” plots. But there is a lot of territory in between foolproof and a 90 percent (or even 50 percent or 30 percent) chance of failure. Why might a group decide against a course of action with a 10 percent chance of killing tens or hundreds of thousands? A group might have better alternatives. An attack on public transportation that has a ninety-five percent chance of killing forty people is a straw man alternative to nuclear terrorism—certainly terrorist groups have intermediate and perhaps, from their perspectives, more compelling options, like suicide aircraft attacks, Madrid and London style bombings, and plots like the one using liquid explosives that failed last summer. Here is another possibility: In the wake of a full-blown nuclear plot, the international campaign against terrorism would likely step into a much higher gear. Would al-Qaeda accept a ninety percent chance of failing to kill more than a massive conventional bomb would while incurring a large risk of provoking a response that might cripple its ability to initiate other plots, nuclear or non-nuclear, in the future? We can’t know the answer, but there is no reason to assume that al-Qaeda would choose such a course.

### Terrorism – Retaliation/Overreaction

No retaliation – your evidence is political scaremongering – there is no risk we overreact and destroy the world – That’s Mueller.

# 1NR Economy

### Economy - No War

#### Countries turn inward – creates peace

Lloyd deMause, director of The Institute for Psychohistory, “Nuclear War as an Anti-Sexual Group Fantasy” Updated December 18th 2002, http://www.geocities.com/kidhistory/ja/nucsex.htm

The nation "turns inward" during this depressed phase of the cycle. Empirical studies have clearly demonstrated that major economic downswings are accompanied by "introverted" foreign policy moods, characterized by fewer armed expeditions, less interest in foreign affairs in the speeches of leaders, reduced military expenditures, etc. (Klingberg, 1952; Holmes, 1985). Just as depressed people experience little conscious rage--feeling "I deserve to be killed" rather than "I want to kill others" (Fenichel, 1945, p. 393)--interest in military adventures during the depressed phase wanes, arms expeditures decrease and peace treaties multiply.

#### No causal relationship – ignores other variables

Niall Ferguson (Laurence A. Tisch Professor of History at Harvard University and a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University) 2006 Foreign Affairs, September/October, Vol. 85, Issue 5

Nor can economic crises explain the bloodshed. What may be the most familiar causal chain in modern historiography links the Great Depression to the rise of fascism and the outbreak of World War II. But that simple story leaves too much out. Nazi Germany started the war in Europe only after its economy had recovered. Not all the countries affected by the Great Depression were taken over by fascist regimes, nor did all such regimes start wars of aggression. In fact, no general relationship between economics and conflict is discernible for the century as a whole. Some wars came after periods of growth, others were the causes rather than the consequences of economic catastrophe, and some severe economic crises were not followed by wars.

#### No escalation – it’s all just rhetoric

Charles Boehmer (political science professor at the University of Texas) 2007 Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”

The theory presented earlier predicts that lower rates of growth suppress participation in foreign conflicts, particularly concerning conflict initiation and escalation to combat. To sustain combat, states need to be militarily prepared and not open up a second front when they are already fighting, or may fear, domestic opposition. A good example would be when the various Afghani resistance fighters expelled the Soviet Union from their territory, but the Taliban crumbled when it had to face the combined forces of the United States and Northern Alliance insurrection. Yet the coefficient for GDP growth and MID initiations was negative but insignificant. However, considering that there are many reasons why states fight, the logic presented earlier should hold especially in regard to the risk of participating in more severe conflicts. Threats to use military force may be safe to make and may be made with both external and internal actors in mind, but in the end may remain mere cheap talk that does not risk escalation if there is a chance to back down. Chiozza and Goemans (2004b) found that secure leaders were more likely to become involved in war than insecure leaders, supporting the theory and evidence presented here. We should find that leaders who face domestic opposition and a poorly performing economy shy away from situations that could escalate to combat if doing so would compromise their ability to retain power.

#### Domestic opposition outweighs – support for military adventures

Daniel Deudney, Hewlett Fellow in Science, Technology, and Society at the Center for Energy and Environmental Studies @ Princeton University, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Environment and Security: Muddled and Thinking April 1991, proquest

In addition, economic decline does not necessarily produce conflict. How societies respond to economic decline may largely depend upon the rate at which such declines occur. And as people get poorer, they may become less willing to spend scarce resources for military forces. As Bernard Brodie observed about the modern era, “The predisposing factors to military aggression are full bellies, not empty ones.” The experience of economic depressions over the last two centuries may be irrelevant, because such depressions were characterized by under-utilized production capacity and falling resource prices. In the 1930s, increased military spending stimulated economies, but if economic growth is retarded by environmental constraints, military spending will exacerbate the problem.

### A2 Diversionary Theory

#### Diversionary war theory is false

Charles Boehmer (political science professor at the University of Texas) 2007 Politics & Policy, 35:4, “The Effects of Economic Crisis, Domestic Discord, and State Efficacy on the Decision to Initiate Interstate Conflict”

This article examines the contemporaneous effect of low economic growth and domestic instability on the threat of regime change and/ or involvement in external militarized conflicts. Many studies of diversionary conflict argue that lower rates of economic growth should heighten the risk of international conflict. Yet we know that militarized interstate conflicts, and especially wars, are generally rare events whereas lower rates of growth are not. Additionally, a growing body of literature shows that regime changes are also associated with lower rates of economic growth. The question then becomes which event, militarized interstate conflict or regime change, is the most likely to occur with domestic discord and lower rates of economic growth? Diversionary theory claims that leaders seek to divert attention away from domestic problems such as a bad economy or political scandals, or to garner increased support prior to elections. Leaders then supposedly externalize discontented domestic sentiments onto other nations, sometimes as scapegoats based on the similar in-group/out-group dynamic found in the research of Coser (1956) and Simmel (1955), where foreign countries are blamed for domestic problems. This process is said to involve a “rally-round-the-flag” effect, where a leader can expect a short-term boost in popularity with the threat or use of force (Blechman, Kaplan, and Hall 1978; Mueller 1973). Scholarship on diversionary conflict has focused most often on the American case1 but recent studies have sought to identify this possible behavior in other countries.2 The Falklands War is often a popular example of diversionary conflict (Levy and Vakili 1992). Argentina was reeling from hyperinflation and rampant unemployment associated with the Latin American debt crisis. It is plausible that a success in the Falklands War may have helped to rally support for the governing Galtieri regime, although Argentina lost the war and the ruling regime lost power. How many other attempts to use diversionary tactics, if they indeed occur, can be seen to generate a similar outcome? The goal of this article is to provide an assessment of the extent to which diversionary strategy is a threat to peace. Is this a colorful theory kept alive by academics that has little bearing upon real events, or is this a real problem that policy makers should be concerned with? If it is a strategy readily available to leaders, then it is important to know what domestic factors trigger this gambit. Moreover, to know that requires an understanding of the context in external conflict, which occurs relative to regime changes. Theories of diversionary conflict usually emphasize the potential benefits of diversionary tactics, although few pay equal attention to the prospective costs associated with such behavior. It is not contentious to claim that leaders typically seek to remain in office. However, whether they can successfully manipulate public opinion regularly during periods of domestic unpopularity through their states’ participation in foreign militarized conflicts—especially outside of the American case—is a question open for debate. Furthermore, there appears to be a logical disconnect between diversionary theories and extant studies of domestic conflict and regime change. Lower rates of economic growth are purported to increase the risk of both militarized interstate conflicts (and internal conflicts) as well as regime changes (Bloomberg and Hess 2002). This implies that if leaders do, in fact, undertake diversionary conflicts, many may still be thrown from the seat of power—especially if the outcome is defeat to a foreign enemy. Diversionary conflict would thus seem to be a risky gambit (Smith 1996). Scholars such as MacFie (1938) and Blainey (1988) have nevertheless questioned the validity of the diversionary thesis. As noted by Levy (1989), this perspective is rarely formulated as a cohesive and comprehensive theory, and there has been little or no knowledge cumulation. Later analyses do not necessarily build on past studies and the discrepancies between inquiries are often difficult to unravel. “Studies have used a variety of research designs, different dependent variables (uses of force, major uses of force, militarized disputes), different estimation techniques, and different data sets covering different time periods and different states” (Bennett and Nordstrom 2000, 39). To these problems, we should add a lack of theoretical precision and incomplete model specification. By a lack of theoretical precision, I am referring to the linkages between economic conditions and domestic strife that remain unclear in some studies (Miller 1995; Russett 1990). Consequently, extant studies are to a degree incommensurate; they offer a step in the right direction but do not provide robust cross-national explanations and tests of economic growth and interstate conflict. Yet a few studies have attempted to provide deductive explanations about when and how diversionary tactics might be employed. Using a Bayesian updating game, Richards and others (1993) theorize that while the use of force would appear to offer leaders a means to boost their popularity, a poorly performing economy acts as a signal to a leader’s constituents about his or her competence. Hence, attempts to use diversion are likely to fail either because incompetent leaders will likewise fail in foreign policy or people will recognize the gambit for what it is. Instead, these two models conclude that diversion is likely to be undertaken particularly by risk-acceptant leaders. This stress on a heightened risk of removal from office is also apparent in the work of Bueno de Mesquita and others (1999), and Downs and Rocke (1994), where leaders may “gamble for resurrection,” although the diversionary scenario in the former study is only a partial extension of their theory on selectorates, winning coalitions, and leader survival. Again, how often do leaders fail in the process or are removed from positions of power before they can even initiate diversionary tactics? A few studies focusing on leader tenure have examined the removal of leaders following war, although almost no study in the diversionary literature has looked at the effects of domestic problems on the relative risks of regime change, interstate conflict, or both events occurring in the same year.3

# 1NR China

## No U.S. China war

#### Chinese leadership wouldn’t risk war.

Ross 2009 (Robert S. Ross is Professor of Political Science at Boston College and Associate of the John King Fairbank Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University, September 2009 “Myth The Great Debate” http://nationalinterest.org/greatdebate/dragons/myth-3819)

Professor Friedberg's concluding suggestion that China's illiberal political system exacerbates the China threat fails to grasp that Beijing's authoritarian system is its greatest vulnerability. The Chinese leadership dares not risk war; it is acutely aware of its vulnerability to the will of its people and the necessity to minimize strategic adventurism and the risk of military defeat, lest it be the cause of its own demise. A balanced rather than an ideological assessment of the Sino-American dynamic offers the United States the confidence to compete with China and secure U.S. interests, and simultaneously promote U.S.-China cooperation.

#### Common interest.

Zhou 2008 (Xinwu Zhou. Economic Interdependence and Peaceful Power Transition. Paper Prepared for the 66th Midwest Political Science Association Annual Conferance. April 3-6, 2008. Online.)

The empirical model shows us how to avoid potential conflict in the future Sino-U.S. power transition. In view of the high price that they would pay for confrontation, the two will definitely try their best to avoid violent clashes. To reduce the chances of conflict, the U.S. should have more engagement with China to enhance the bilateral relationship, it should also aim at increasing China’s involvement in regional and international affairs. Chinese participation in the North Korean nuclear issue dialogue is a good start toward integration of China into East Asian regional affairs, which might increase Chinese satisfaction to the status quo. Multilateral economic ties are another important way to increase the probability of cooperation between China and the whole system. It is possible to transform the three aspects of co-operation, competition, and conflicts in Sino-US relations. As long as China and the United States have many economic ties and cultural communications, they will be able to turn their struggles and conflicts into competition and co-operation. A future with healthy competition and co-operation is in the basic interests of the Chinese and the U.S. people

#### And, redundant checks to prevent crisis.

Yang 2004 (Jiemian Yang, visiting fellow with the UCLA Center for Chinese Studies, "Crisis Management and US China Relations." 2004, http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=6171)

In recent years the two sides have been trying to match up better in crisis management. The two countries have learned a lesson in the past two decades of crises and have decided to strive for better crisis management. The two governments are working at better communication and more frequent interaction between the two governments during crises. Moreover, they are increasingly stressing their mutual and common interests, especially in strategic areas like anti-terrorism and non-proliferation. Besides, both China and the United States have become more careful and have adopted preventive measures in sensitive situations that might lead to a crisis. In addition to official communication, there has been an increase in semi-official and non-official efforts. Various kinds of second and third track talks are indeed contributing to preventing and controlling crises. And some farsighted experts and scholars are studying how to gear up the crisis management systems in the two countries.

## China encirclement turn

### Sino-India War Impact Calc 2NC

#### Escalation is likely- tensions and historical rivalries

Emmott 8 (Bill, Former Editor – Economist, “Tibet is one thing, but India and China tensions Spell Bigger Disaster”, Sunday Times, 3-30, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1993902/posts)

An array of disputes, historical bitternesses and regional flashpoints weigh down on all three countries. Conflict is not inevitable but nor is it inconceivable. If it were to occur – over Taiwan, say, or the Korean peninsula or Tibet or Pakistan – it would not simply be an intra-Asian affair. The outside world would be drawn in. Such a conflict could break out suddenly. This month’s unrest in Tibet has shown just how volatile China can be – and how easily one of those flashpoints could cause international tension. In 1962 China and India fought a border war that humiliated India and left an enduring legacy of bitterness and suspicion. Both countries are now increasing their military spending and trying to modernise their armed forces.

#### Conflict is probable- military buildups

Dan Darling is an international military markets analyst with Forecast International Inc., an aerospace and defense research company March 24, 2010 The Faster Times “Will the Indian Ocean Become the Next Arena of Great Power Conflict?” http://www.thefastertimes.com/defensespending/2010/03/24/will-the-indian-ocean-become-the-next-arena-of-great-power-conflict/

China’s expansionary efforts in the Indian Ocean region have been dubbed by the Pentagon as the “string of pearls” strategy. But while the creation and development of logistical support bases represent a necessary component of this strategy, military muscle is what underwrites its execution. With an expansionary defense budget expected to reach close to $80 billion in 2010, China is the world’s second-largest military investor and has allocated more and more to naval capabilities in the past decade. Like India, the PLAN has undertaken its own blue-water naval development. This involves the continued expansion of its submarine, destroyer and oil tanker fleets, and possibly the construction of one or more aircraft carriers. India, which for the time being arguably has a naval edge on China, is pushing forward on a ten-year, $15 billion naval acquisition plan. India’s plan to grow its blue-water capabilities includes bringing three aircraft carriers into naval service by 2015. Among some of the crucial naval platforms in Indian development are six Scorpene submarines produced under license with French technologies (plus a follow-on order for six additional submarines), six improved Project 17A (improved Shivalik-class) frigates, a nuclear-powered missile submarine (the INS Arihant), and the domestically-built Project 15 (Delhi-class) destroyers. India has also introduced Russian MiG-29K jet fighters into its aircraft fleet, intending to deploy them on the carrier INS Vikramadity – formerly the Russian carrier Admiral Gorshkov – when it finally is introduced into Indian naval service. India is also taking steps to expand its air force bases in the Andaman and Nicobar island chains and plans to station Su-30MKI fighters, mid-air refuelling tankers and short- and medium-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) on these island bases. This dual naval build-up has become worrisome for those with vested interests in the greater Indian Ocean. The U.S. Navy had long been entrusted with protecting shipping through the region. But with China’s rise as an economic power and status as budding rival to the U.S., Beijing is unlikely to view the American 5th Fleet as some metaphorical benevolent hand helping to protect its sea lines of communication. Indeed, American efforts to court India as a foil against China’s expanding regional influence have only added to Chinese distrust regarding Washington’s intentions. Then there is Japan, which like China relies heavily upon energy transshipment through the Indian Ocean. With a heightened PLAN presence across the same shipping lane Japan uses to ferry Middle East oil to its ports, Tokyo might opt to bolster its own naval component, thus upping the naval traffic in the region and increasing the possibility for friction.

### SCS Coop Now

#### China is willing to settle South China Sea disputes through cooperation and negotiation

Wu Shicun Who are the real troublemakers in the South China Sea? Globaltimes.cn | 2012-11-6 21:17:06 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/742715.shtml

China adheres to the road of peaceful development, unswervingly pursuing an independent foreign policy of peace and a defense policy that is defensive in nature rather than trying to expand its sphere of influence. Never seeking hegemony is China's solemn commitment to the whole world.¶ China is a committed protector of the peace and stability of the South China Sea. It has never claimed sovereignty over the entire South China Sea, nor will it expand its current claim. The Chinese people love peace, and uphold the principle of good neighborly friendship.¶ Yet, it does not mean that China will accept its territorial sovereignty or maritime rights and interests being infringed by foreign countries. China respects other countries, and is willing to settle territorial and jurisdictional disputes with its neighbors through consultations and negotiations on a friendly and equal basis. But China’s legitimate rights and appeals must get its due respect and assurance.

#### China supports cooperative solutions to the South China Sea dispute

Wu Shicun Who are the real troublemakers in the South China Sea? Globaltimes.cn | 2012-11-6 21:17:06 http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/742715.shtml

Exercising self-restraint and seeking consensus while shelving differences is the wise step to take at present to address the South China Sea issue, while consultation, dialogue and pragmatic cooperation will be the only way to its final settlement. China has been fulfilling its commitments to regional stability and development with real actions. Other countries concerned shall also undertake their unshirkable responsibilities and duties.¶ An important part of dialogue and cooperation between China and ASEAN countries now is to carry out the Guidelines for Implementing the DOC and a series of follow-up actions. One element of the guidelines is to discuss and formulate a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC), toward which China’s attitude is open and active. Currently, the most pressing task is for parties concerned to respect and honor the spirit of the DOC, push forward direct negotiations and consultations, and enhance practical cooperation.¶ This is conducive to not only a peaceful and stable South China Sea but also the common interest of all parties. China stands ready to join hands with other countries concerned to settle related disputes by peaceful means, strengthen mutual trust, avoid misunderstanding, deepen cooperation and develop South China Sea into a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.

### China Rise Impact

#### China rise causes escalation

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China, invariably mentioned as America's prospective successor, has an impressive imperial lineage and a strategic tradition of carefully calibrated patience, both of which have been critical to its overwhelmingly successful, several-thousand-year-long history. China thus prudently accepts the existing international system, even if it does not view the prevailing hierarchy as permanent. It recognizes that success depends not on the system's dramatic collapse but on its evolution toward a gradual redistribution of power. Moreover, the basic reality is that China is not yet ready to assume in full America's role in the world. Beijing's leaders themselves have repeatedly emphasized that on every important measure of development, wealth, and power, China will still be a modernizing and developing state several decades from now, significantly behind not only the United States but also Europe and Japan in the major per capita indices of modernity and national power. Accordingly, Chinese leaders have been restrained in laying any overt claims to global leadership.¶ At some stage, however, a more assertive Chinese nationalism could arise and damage China's international interests. A swaggering, nationalistic Beijing would unintentionally mobilize a powerful regional coalition against itself. None of China's key neighbors -- India, Japan, and Russia -- is ready to acknowledge China's entitlement to America's place on the global totem pole. They might even seek support from a waning America to offset an overly assertive China. The resulting regional scramble could become intense, especially given the similar nationalistic tendencies among China's neighbors. A phase of acute international tension in Asia could ensue. Asia of the 21st century could then begin to resemble Europe of the 20th century -- violent and bloodthirsty.

## 2NC

#### Environment impacts outweigh-

#### Concede that ANWR, arctic drilling kills arctic biod which is key to broader biod.

#### A. Impacts previously underestimated

Science Daily, 11, 8-19-2011, “Biodiversity Critical for Maintaining Multiple 'Ecosystem Services'“, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/08/110819155422.htm

By combining data from 17 of the largest and longest-running biodiversity experiments, scientists from universities across North America and Europe have found that previous studies have underestimated the importance of biodiversity for maintaining multiple ecosystem services across many years and places. "Most previous studies considered only the number of species needed to provide one service under one set of environmental conditions," says Prof. Michel Loreau from McGill University's biology department who supervised the study. "These studies found that many species appeared redundant. That is, it appeared that the extinction of many species would not affect the functioning of the ecosystem because other species could compensate for their loss." Now, by looking at grassland plant species, investigators have found that most of the studied species were important at least once for the maintenance of ecosystem services, because different sets of species were important during different years, at different places, for different services, and under different global change (e.g., climate or land-use change) scenarios. Furthermore, the species needed to provide one service during multiple years were not the same as those needed to provide multiple services during one year. "This means that biodiversity is even more important for maintaining ecosystem services than was previously thought," says Dr. Forest Isbell, the lead author and investigator of this study. "Our results indicate that many species are needed to maintain ecosystem services at multiple times and places in a changing world, and that species are less redundant than was previously thought." The scientists involved in the study also offer recommendations for using these results to prioritize conservation efforts and predict consequences of species extinctions. "It is nice to know which groups of species promoted ecosystem functioning under hundreds of sets of environmental conditions," says Isbell, "because this will allow us to determine whether some species often provide ecosystem services under environmental conditions that are currently common, or under conditions that will become increasingly common in the future." But Michel Loreau, of McGill, adds au cautionary note: "We should be careful when making predictions. The uncertainty over future environmental changes means that conserving as much biodiversity as possible could be a good precautionary approach."

#### B. reversibility

Cass R. Sunstein () 2007 “WORST-CASE SCENARIOS” p. 176-7, Harry Kalven Visitng Professor, Professor of Law at Harvard Law School but is currently on leave to serve as the Administrator of the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs in the Obama administration, and

In ordinary life, our judgments about worst-case scenarios have everything to do with irreversibility. Of course an action may be hard but not impossible to undo, and so there may be a continuum of cases, with different degrees of difficulty in reversing. A marriage can be reversed, but divorce is rarely easy; having a child is very close to irreversible; moving from New York to Paris is reversible, but moving back may be difficult. People often take steps to avoid courses of action that are burdensome rather than literally impossible to reverse. In this light,we might identify an Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle, applicable to a subset of risks.3 As a rough first approximation, the principle says this: Special steps should be taken to avoid irreversible harms, through precautions that go well beyond those that would be taken if irreversibility were not a problem. The general attitude here is “act, then learn,” as opposed to the tempting alternative of “wait and learn.” In the case of climate change, some people believe that research should be our first line of defense. In their view, we should refuse to commit substantial resources to the problem until evidence of serious harm is unmistakably clear.4 But even assuming that the evidence is not so clear, research without action allows greenhouse gas emissions to continue, which might produce risks that are irreversible, or at best difficult and expensive to reverse. For this reason, the best course of action might well be to take precautions now as a way of preserving flexibility for future generations. In the environmental context in general, this principle suggests that regulators should proceed with far more aggressive measures than would otherwise seem justified.5

#### c. invisible tipping point

Science Daily, 11, 3-3-2011, “Loss of Plant Diversity Threatens Earth's Life-Support Systems, Experts Say”, http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2011/03/110303153116.htm

Biodiversity loss in the real world Recognizing that their findings mostly rest on analysis of short-term experiments (generally a few days, weeks, or months) in relatively small settings, the researchers also attempted to determine how diversity effects "scale-up" to longer time scales, bigger areas, or both. The authors note that these are the real-world scales "at which species extinctions actually matter and at which conservation and management efforts take place." The team's findings suggest that scale does indeed matter, and that small laboratory and field experiments typically underestimate the effects of biodiversity loss. In the researchers' own words, "Data are generally consistent with the idea that the strength of diversity effects are stronger in experiments that run longer, and in experiments performed at larger spatial scales." Duffy is now further testing this scaling issue with a 3-year grant from the U.S. National Science Foundation. He is using the grant to establish a global experimental network for studying how nutrient pollution and changes in biodiversity impact seagrass beds. Study co-author Jarrett Byrnes, of the National Center for Ecological Analyses and Synthesis, says "Species extinction is happening now, and it's happening quickly. And unfortunately, our resources are limited. This means we're going to have to prioritize our conservation efforts, and to do that, scientists have to start providing concrete answers about the numbers and types of species that are needed to sustain human life. If we don't produce these estimates quickly, then we risk crossing a threshold that we can't come back from."

#### Artic is ecological tipping point

Michael Engelhard August 6, 2012(Master's degree in anthropology from the University of Alaska “We cannot drill our way out of this mess: A review of Arctic Voices” http://www.hcn.org/hcn/issues/44.13/we-cannot-drill-our-way-out-of-this-mess-a-review-of-arctic-voices)

The Arctic is the planet's ecological tipping point: The polar regions not only suffer greater warming than lower latitudes, but the rapid loss of sea ice and permafrost there is accelerating the process to where it could spiral out of control, beyond even the direst predictions. Arctic Voices also touches upon Iceland, Greenland and Siberia, driving home the point of global connectedness. "Climate scientists have made it clear," writes Ricki Ott, a toxicologist and fisherwoman who witnessed the Exxon Valdez spill, "that if people wish to have a livable planet for their children, the Oil Age must end soon, regardless of how much oil is left to extract."

## A2: Perm do the CP

#### The CP is net less than the plan- the plan removes restrictions on all offshore drilling- the CP removes restrictions on all of the Outer Continental Shelf

#### The Alaskan shelf is considered separate as part of OCSLA

Cunningham 2012 [Nicholas Cunningham Policy Analyst at the American Security Project July 12, 2012 The Arctic Institute “Offshore Oil Drilling in the U.S. Arctic, Part One: Legal Context” http://www.thearcticinstitute.org/2012/07/offshore-oil-drilling-in-us-arctic-part.html]

In order to codify federal control of the mineral resources beyond the three-mile limit, the U.S. Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.[vii] OCSLA also granted the Department of the Interior the responsibility for administering the exploration and exploitation of natural resources on the outer continental shelf (OCS). The Secretary of Interior would grant leases to the highest qualified responsible bidder, according to sealed bids.[viii] Today, DOI has divided the OCS into four regions: the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexico, the Pacific, and Alaska. OCSLA was amended in 1978 to give states a greater participatory role in the leasing process.[ix] The reforms also required the Secretary of Interior to establish a five-year plan for the leasing program, which best meets “national energy needs” for that period.[x] Additionally, OCSLA grants the President the power of issuing moratoria on offshore oil drilling in the OCS.[xi]

#### There are restrictions on Alaskan drilling

Spakovsky and Loris 12 [Hans, Senior Legal Fellow / Manager, Civil Justice Reform Initiative, and Nicholas, Herbert and Joyce Morgan Fellow, 8/13/12, "Offshore Drilling: Increase Access, Reduce the Risk, and Stop Hurting American Companies" The Heritage Foundation http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/08/offshore-drilling-increase-access-reduce-the-risk-and-stop-hurting-american-companies]

The recent lease sale in the Central Gulf of Mexico was a welcoming sign (especially since the Administration delayed part of the sale in 2010), but the new five-year leasing plan for 2012–2017 is extremely disappointing. The Administration failed to unlock the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, as well as the Eastern Gulf of Mexico and areas off Alaska’s coast. As a result, a meager 15 percent of America’s territorial waters are available for oil and gas exploration. The Minerals Management Service estimates that 101 billion barrels of oil and 480 trillion cubic feet of natural gas of proven reserves and undiscovered resources are awaiting exploration in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). Opening these areas would generate hundreds of thousands of new jobs, generate hundreds of billions of dollars in government revenue, and bring more oil to the world market, thereby lowering gas prices.[9]

#### The aff also lifts restrictions on when they can drill in the Arctic

Callus 2012 [Andrew Callus 9-17-2012 NBC News “Shell admits Arctic drilling defeat, for now” http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/49066128/ns/business-oil\_and\_energy/#.UFkqsHKUfpg]

Shell had until September 24 to drill into oil reservoirs in the Chukchi Sea, according to U.S. rules designed to accommodate the dangers of drilling in increasing ice and deteriorating weather in the environmentally sensitive region.¶ But Shell's U.S. offshore Arctic expedition has cost $4.5 billion since 2005, almost one sixth of Shell's annual capital spending budget, and has faced a series of setbacks.¶ The latest came on Monday when the company said its containment dome, a giant metal box on a barge that is standing by to help contain any oil spill resulting from a well blowout, had been damaged during tests.¶ "In order to lay a strong foundation for operations in 2013, we will forgo drilling into hydrocarbon zones this year. Instead, we will begin as many wells, known as `top holes,' as time remaining in this season allows," the company said.¶ By October 31, Shell must halt all operations, including top hole wells which stop short of the oil reservoirs but prepare the way for drilling in earnest next year.¶ Last week, Shell was forced to unhook its drilling vessel from anchors holding it over a drill site to escape encroaching ice, just a day after it started drilling the first hole in the Chukchi seabed for more than two decades.¶ The work had begun after a series of delays having finally won permission from the U.S. Interior Department and the Environmental Protection Agency. U.S. regulatory oversight of the Arctic has long been intensive, but it has stepped up a gear since the Macondo oil spill in 2010.¶ The absence of a certificate for the barge itself from the U.S. Coast Guard delayed operations earlier in the summer. Ice cover in unexpected quantities has also been a complication.¶ Shell's activities in the Beaufort Sea, another Arctic province, have been hit by some of the same issues and by the need to avoid disturbing the autumn whale hunting season nearby. Drillers there have yet to get a drill bit into the seabed.

## a/t offshore drilling

#### “Federal lands” means both onshore and offshore

Politfact April 18, 2012

<http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2012/apr/13/crossroads-gps/crossroads-gps-ad-oil-production-obama/> Crossroads GPS ad says oil production on federal lands dropped under President Barack Obama Says oil "production's down where Obama's in charge." Crossroads GPS on Tuesday, April 10th, 2012 in a Web ad

Greenwire, the energy news service cited by Crossroads, published Interior Department numbers for oil production on federal lands and waters in a Feb. 27, 2012, story, citing them in a second story, which was the piece Crossroads used. The story said, "Oil production fell by 14 percent in fiscal 2011 below the previous year on federal lands and waters, according to statistics provided last month by the Interior Department." So, oil production on federal lands, onshore and offshore, fell from 2010-11, according to Obama administration agencies. So far, so good, for Crossroads’ analysis — other than the fact that it failed to cite a time period for the statistic it quoted from Greenwire.

#### The northern slope includes federal lands

Brent Sheets, NETL (Nat’l Energy Tech Lab), Arctic Energy Office, April 2009

NETL Contact: Brent Sheets Manager Arctic Energy Office Prepared by: Charles P. Thomas–RDS, LLC/SAIC Walter B. North–RDS, LLC/SAIC Tom C. Doughty–Consultant David M. Hite–Consultant National Energy Technology Laboratory http://www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/oil-gas/publications/AEO/ANS\_Potential.pdf ALASKA NORTH SLOPE OIL AND GAS: A Promising Future or an Area in Decline? DOE/NETL-2009/1385

This report presents an update of the detailed assessment and analysis of the oil and gas resources on Alaska‘s North Slope published in August 2007 entitled Alaska North Slope Oil and Gas–A Promising Future or an Area in Decline? U. S. Department of Energy, DOE/NETL- 2007/1279. The region covered in the assessment is the Arctic Alaska area north of the Brooks Range, extending from the Canadian border on the east to the Chukchi Sea Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) on the west. Five sub-provinces are evaluated: the 1002 Area of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), the Central Arctic (area between the Colville and Canning Rivers), the National Petroleum Reserve Alaska (NPRA), the Beaufort Sea OCS, and the Chukchi Sea OCS. Land ownership consists of a combination of federal lands, state lands, and Alaska native lands. The assessment published in 2007 included: (a) a review of the regional geology relative to oil and gas resources; (b) an engineering assessment of the currently producing fields, known fields with announced development plans, and known fields with potential for development in the next few years; (c) impact of major gas sales on oil and gas resource development: and (d) possible forecasts of composited production rates for exploration areas. This report includes an update of the Arctic Alaska resources based on drilling, development, and production history through December 31, 2007. The basic geological framework, petroleum geology, and history of development have not changed and are not updated and the reader is referred to the 2007 report. Production forecasts for technically recoverable resources (oil, natural gas, and natural gas liquids (NGLs)) are updated for producing fields, fields and pools under development, and known fields and pools under evaluation. Generalized production forecasts for undiscovered resources in the exploration areas described in the geology section, Section 2, are also presented.

#### Aff uniquely opens ANWR

John Barrasso, Chair, Senate Republican Policy Committee, July 25, 2012

http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0CD0QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.rpc.senate.gov%2Fdownload%2Fobama-energy-plan&ei=mMOdUKyEIoPf0QHYgYGgBQ&usg=AFQjCNFDPt5blAjwVhHgdN3SQTIZlu2\_mQ Obama’s No New Access Energy Plan Continued Campaign Against Energy Exploration

Data Acquisition: The ANWR has a long history of geological study and mapping. The first geologic mapping was by Leffingwell in 1919. He reported oil seeps and oil-stained rocks within what is now ANWR and established the general stratigraphic sequence as it is known today. Industry-sponsored field work was sparse until after the discovery of Prudhoe Bay. In 1969, at least eight companies participated in field programs of varying duration and completeness. A minimum of 20 to 25 crew-months of geologic mapping and evaluation were logged in 1969. Subsequently geological programs varied from less than a crew-month to five to six crew-months throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Geophysical activity within the 1002 Area has historically consisted of the less invasive, but limited value, gravity and magnetic surveys. The only seismic acquisition within ANWR occurred during two successive field seasons in 1984 and 1985 under federal oversight. A 22-company consortium shared the costs of acquisition and processing. These two seasons produced approximately 1,450 line-miles of data (Table 2.8). The data were of mostly poor to moderately good quality. Exploration Drilling: There has been no exploration drilling on federal lands within the 1002 Area or any other federally controlled portion of ANWR. However, the area is surrounded on all sides, except to the south, by exploration wells drilled on state, native corporation, federal OCS, and Canadian OCS acreage. At least 40 wells have been drilled within 20 miles of the 1002 Area. These wells have found at least six oil and (or) gas accumulations.

#### No Alaskan secession – Alaskan Constitution, impossibility to hold office

Megan Holland, “No secession vote for Alaska, state Supreme Court rules,” Anchorage Daily News, January 22, 2010, <http://www.adn.com/2010/01/22/1106430/no-secession-vote-for-alaska-state.html>, accessed 11-9-2012.

The Alaska Supreme Court has rejected an Anchorage man's effort to change the Alaska Constitution so that he could call a vote for secession from the United States.¶ "Alaskans' political lives are inextricably tied to both the government of the State of Alaska and the government of the United States of America," wrote Justice Dana Fabe in the court's unanimous decision in Scott Kohlhaas' case.¶ Kohlhaas, a 50-year-old political consultant who is also chair of the Alaska Libertarian Party, wants Alaska to be its own country.¶ "I want independence," he said in an interview this week. "This is our land. These are our people. And we have the right to choose our own destiny."¶ Kohlhaas tried to bring the independence question to voters in 2003 but the lieutenant governor refused to certify his ballot initiative and Kohlhaas took the case to the courts. The Supreme Court rejected his efforts, saying at the time: "When the forty-nine star flag was first raised in Juneau, we Alaskans committed ourselves to that indestructible Union, for good or ill, in perpetuity."¶ Kohlhaas' 2007 effort was slightly different. It was for a ballot initiative asking voters to change existing law and Alaska Constitution provisions to authorize secession.¶ The Supreme Court ruled the core of both measures remains the same -- secession -- and that's still illegal.¶ Ballot initiatives are to propose and enact legislation. The lieutenant governor's office can refuse to certify initiatives that are clearly illegal, Fabe said.¶ In issuing the unanimous decision, Fabe quoted President Abraham Lincoln, saying, "The Union of these States is perpetual."¶ Fabe noted that the Alaska Constitution created a state government that is linked to the United States government, including a provision that disqualifies from public office anyone who advocates, or belongs to an organization that advocates, violent overthrow of the U.S. government.¶

#### No arctic wars

James Collins et. al June 24, 2009 "The Arctic Challenge" (conclusions of a joint panel of experts from Dartmouth College and the Carnigee endowment) <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/?fa=eventDetail&id=1359&prog=zgp&proj=zdrl>

-Conflict over resources and boundaries is unlikely because most affected areas are subject to Law of the Sea norms.

 -The International Maritime Organization is an important mechanism to increase cooperation between nations on shipping in the Arctic.

 -The decreased pace of development in the Arctic brought on by the economic crisis should be used by governments to resolve existing disputes and governance issues.

-Political and Security Issues

-Militarized conflict over the Arctic is unlikely, and regional disputes are unlikely to cause an overall deterioration in relations between or among polar nations.

 -Security issues should not be sensationalized in order to attract attention towards the Arctic.

# Politics

## OVERVIEW

#### Middle East war is a bigger impact than theirs… more inherent instability, irrational actors

#### They only access regional conflcits, MIDDLE EAST WAR GOES NUCLEAR AND ESCULATES GLOBALLY

STEINBACH 2002[John, Israeli Nuclear weapons: a threat to piece, 3/3 http://www.converge.org.nz/pma/mat0036.htm]

Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum (and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major (if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening Middle East conflict could trigger a world conflagration."

#### Middle East war is uniquely likely and escalatory

James A. Russell (managing editor of Strategic Insights, senior lecturer in the Department of National Security Affairs at NPS, From 1988-2001 held a variety of positions in the Office of the Assistant Secretary Defense for International Security Affairs, Near East South Asia, Department of Defense) Spring 2009 “Strategic Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East” <http://www.analyst-network.com/articles/141/StrategicStabilityReconsideredProspectsforEscalationandNuclearWarintheMiddleEast.pdf>

Strategic stability in the region is thus undermined by various factors: (1) asymmetric interests in the bargaining framework that can introduce unpredictable behavior from actors; (2) the presence of non-state actors that introduce unpredictability into relationships between the antagonists; (3) incompatible assumptions about the structure of the deterrent relationship that makes the bargaining framework strategically unstable; (4) perceptions by Israel and the United States that its window of opportunity for military action is closing, which could prompt a preventive attack; (5) the prospect that Iran’s response to pre-emptive attacks could involve unconventional weapons, which could prompt escalation by Israel and/or the United States; (6) the lack of a communications framework to build trust and cooperation among framework participants. These systemic weaknesses in the coercive bargaining framework all suggest that escalation by any the parties could happen either on purpose or as a result of miscalculation or the pressures of wartime circumstance.

#### TF, Prob – Regional developments make nuclear escalation likely

Blank 2001 (Stephen- prof @ Strategic Studies Institute @ US Army War College, World and I, 2/1/01)

After seven or more years of America's best efforts, we now should see with whom we are dealing and the multiple fronts of the real Middle East war. In today's Middle East, every form of conflict along the spectrum from rock throwing to nuclear war can take place. Governments there have long since used weapons of mass destruction in other states' civil wars. Further opportunities to start these civil wars or use such weapons must be firmly deterred and discouraged. Rather than choose peace and democracy, Arafat and his allies have chosen war and hatred. Israel and the United States should act together to make sure that they never get to make another similar choice.

## Internal Link overview

#### Senate democrats key to avoid fiscal cliff – they fear getting sold out

Jonathan Cohn November 7, 2012

[http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/109904/boehner-statement-fiscal-cliff-revenue-election-obama-leverage#](http://www.tnr.com/blog/plank/109904/boehner-statement-fiscal-cliff-revenue-election-obama-leverage) How the Election Reset the “Fiscal Cliff” Debate

This time, Republicans probably feel they have more to lose. The automatic cuts affect a wide variety of programs, but they hit defense spending particularly hard. Obama doesn’t have to run for reelection anymore. And he wants taxes on the wealthy to go up. Allowing the Bush tax cuts to expire would accomplish that, although Obama would likely react by trying to restore—or effectively replace—the cuts for the middle class. As folks like Jonathan Chait have been saying for a while, Obama appears to have a much stronger bargaining position this time around. And during a press conference on Wednesday, Vice President Biden seemed to say he agreed. “There was a clear, a clear sort of mandate," Biden said, "about people coming much closer to our view about how to deal with tax policy.” But liberals will be watching closely—very closely—to make sure the White House and congressional Democrats put this leverage to good use. Neera Tanden, president of the Center for American Progress and occasional TNR contributor, puts it this way: It would be deeply discouraging to all those who have worked so hard over the last two years to elect the president and expand the Democratic majority in the senate to simply reset the fiscal cliff negotiations back to where it was a year and a half ago, with too little revenue on the table and too many hits to beneficiaries. And that is why I expect that any final negotiation will better reflect the priorities of the American people.

#### Obama & Boehner want a deal – the question is whether Obama can keep Senate Dems in line

Jennifer Rubin | 03:05 PM ET, 11/09/2012

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/can-obama-make-a-deal-this-time/2012/11/09/0abb179c-2aa0-11e2-96b6-8e6a7524553f\_blog.html Can Obama make a deal this time?

This is precisely where we were about 15 months ago when the grand bargain on precisely these terms broke down. It may shock dim reporters or confuse Democratic spinners, but this is nothing new. The only thing that has changed is that the president has the experience of seeing a grand bargain of historic proportions slip through his grasp. He and Boehner know precisely where the deal is to be had — where they were when Obama upped the ante on taxes and the grand bargain crumbled. The political alignment is not unlike what it was in 2011. The president and Boehner want a deal. Senate Democrats from red states who will face voters in 2014 don’t want to send the country over the fiscal cliff or be tagged as tax hikers. Senate House members and safe blue state Senate Democrats would just as soon demand a tax rate hike, let the country go over the cliff and blame Republicans. What is different today, however, is that the president really has no interest in getting pushed around by unrealistic liberals in his party. They might have to stand for reelection, but he doesn’t and it must pain him to realize the grand bargain got away last time. As for Senate Republicans they already passed the revenue-raising Rubicon in the supercommittee when Sen. Pat Toomey (R-Pa.) put a deal on the table that would have increased revenue without tax hikes. There will be a Kabuki dance when everyone comes to the White House next week for a meeting on the fiscal cliff. But that said, the opportunity for a deal is very much there just as it was more than a year ago. The only question is whether the president has the nerve and skill to grab it this time.

## Uniqueness

### Deal Now

#### Obama has the high ground- people are willing to negotiate

Healey 11-9 [Jon Healey 11-9-2012 LA Times “President Obama talks tough on the fiscal cliff” http://www.latimes.com/news/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-obama-talks-tough-on-fiscal-cliff-20121109,0,4421577.story]

Obama actually went a bit further than his Republican counterparts in trying to ratchet up the political pressure. He noted that everyone's taxes are slated to rise in January; the only disagreement between Republicans and Democrats is whether to raise rates for individuals earning more than $200,000 and couples earning more than $250,000.¶ "Now, fortunately, we shouldn’t need long negotiations or drama to solve that part of the problem," Obama said. Noting that the Senate has already passed a bill to continue the Bush-era tax cuts for everyone except those higher-income households and small businesses, Obama said, "All we need is action from the House. And I’ve got the pen ready to sign the bill right away. I'm ready to do it."¶ The president knows full well that Republicans aren't about to step into that trap; renewing the tax cuts for the middle class eliminates much of the negotiating leverage they might have for continuing the tax cuts for the upper incomes.¶ Boehner wasted little time putting a match to that proposal:¶ “The increased tax rates that would be allowed under the Senate-passed bill are part of the fiscal cliff that economists are warning us to avoid," the speaker said. "Those increased tax rates will destroy jobs in America by hurting small businesses across the country. Republicans are eager to get to work on an agreement that averts the entire fiscal cliff."¶ Still, Obama made clear Friday that he's not backing away from his campaign pledge to seek a "balanced" solution to the deficit that cuts spending and wrings more tax dollars from high-income Americans.¶ "That’s how we did it in the 1990s, when Bill Clinton was president," Obama said. "That’s how we can reduce the deficit while still making the investments we need to build a strong middle class and a strong economy. That’s the only way we can still afford to train our workers, or help our kids pay for college, or make sure that good jobs in clean energy or high-tech manufacturing don’t end up in countries like China....¶ "And I just want to point out this was a central question during the election. It was debated over and over again. And on Tuesday night, we found out that the majority of Americans agree with my approach."¶ Bear in mind that Boehner had doubled down Friday morning on his opposition to raising tax rates on anybody, including high-income "job creators." But these are just opening offers. Even with the government slated to reach the fiscal cliff on Jan. 1, it's too early for either side to make any real concessions.¶ And besides, the positions taken by each side, as far apart as they may seem, still have some overlap.¶ As The Times' editorial board observed Friday, the GOP's opening offer rules out only tax rate increases, not revenue increases achieved through tax "reform." In other words, Republicans explicitly left on the table the possibility of having high-income households pay more by eliminating some of the deductions, exemptions and other preferences that lower their tax bills.

#### Major deal will happen- Obama is bringing everyone together

Wall Street Journal 11-8 [Wall Street Journal 11-8-2012 “Focus Shifts to 'Fiscal Cliff'” NAFTALI BENDAVID, DAMIAN PALETTA and DAVID WESSEL http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323894704578105260044138592.html]

To tackle the fiscal cliff, Mr. Obama is expected to initiate a new round of talks with leaders of Congress. The goal would be a "grand bargain" combining higher taxes and money-saving changes to federal benefit programs.¶ "If there's a mandate in yesterday's results, it's a mandate to find a way for us to work together," House Speaker John Boehner said Wednesday. "My message today is not one of confrontation but of conviction."¶ The White House said Mr. Obama called all the four top congressional leaders late Tuesday night after he knew he had won—reaching two of them then, and connecting with the other two Wednesday morning—and asked them to "put aside their partisan interests and work with common purpose." In a post-midnight victory speech, the president identified "reducing our deficit" and "reforming our tax code" as among his top priorities.¶ Republicans noticed, approvingly, that neither he nor top congressional Democrats repeated Mr. Obama's campaign insistence on raising marginal-income tax rates on the top 2% of Americans, a proposal Republicans reject.¶ ¶ The president's Senate nemesis, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, also extended a hand. "The American people…gave President Obama a second chance to fix the problems that even he admits he failed to solve during his first four years," he said. "To the extent he wants to move to the political center…we'll be there to meet him half way."

### A2: Intrinsicness

## Links

### A2 Olive Branch turns

#### The turn is a link because the timing is wrong – olive branches might work someday, but will cause a harder line Republican position in the near term – SQ executive branch approach better

Kevin Book, managing director at ClearView Energy Partners: Wednesday, November 7, 2012

http://www.eenews.net/eenewspm/2012/11/07/archive/8?terms=nuclear+obama ClearView Energy's Book discusses impact of Obama re-election, congressional outcome on energy, environment policy

Monica Trauzzi: So, Kevin, a late night. President Obama retaining the presidency, the Republicans maintaining the House, and the Senate going to the Democrats. Does this mean the status quo on energy and environment policy, or did you see some sort of paradigm shift where we can expect things to change from how they've been the last four years? Kevin Book: Well, that's a, that's the kind of question that a mixed election outcome is going to bring a mixed answer. So here's your mixed answer. You have two years of a return to the regulatory agenda from 2009, which is to say that there's a lot of pent-up environmental energy, call it caged up, if you will, that is going to get released, because there's going to be lawsuits if it doesn't. So the regulatory agenda will be how energy policy moves until at least the midterm elections, and quite frankly, that regulatory policy is going to be left of center.Monica Trauzzi: So we're going to get into more specifics on that in a second. On President Obama specifically, do you think that he is going to work with congressional leadership differently now, because he doesn't have to worry about getting re-elected? Is there going to be more compromise? Kevin Book: The Bill Clinton question. Is this the moment where he can move to the center safely? And the answer is probably yes, except that he has to have somebody on the other side moving with him. If you look at the demographics of the Senate, you have another election in 2014 where the Republicans still have a chance. It may be that holding the line is the way to go. If the tea party comes in strong, and it looks like they're still holding, and we'll find out final results at the end of the day, probably, then what we'll know is that there's a, sort of a reinforced, emboldened Republican will to resist and to ask for the big deal, even though the president retained election, even though the Republicans didn't claim the Senate, because there is still a 2014 possibility. If that evaporates because Republicans are willing to do a deal in the Senate, then the centrist ovations of the president might be answered. But I wouldn't think it starts out that way.

#### Nearly every Senate dem hates the plan – fiat requires getting 19 to switch votes

Jim Hoft March 14, 2012,

<http://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2012/03/senate-democrats-reject-keystone-pipeline-anwr-drilling-in-one-easy-vote/> Senate Democrats Reject Keystone Pipeline & ANWR Drilling In One Easy Vote

Senate Democrats rejected the Keystone Pipeline and drilling in ANWR yesterday in a single vote. EVERY DEMOCRAT, except for Senator Begich from Alaska, voted against the legislation that would increase American oil production. The Pioneer Press reported: The Senate on Tuesday resoundingly rejected a sweeping measure to open the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and other protected areas to oil drilling, as well as to approve construction of the Keystone pipeline project. Tuesday’s vote was the first time in four years that the Senate has voted on a measure including ANWR drilling, and it failed miserably. The proposal needed 60 votes to pass; it only received 41 votes in favor, with 57 senators against. Kansas Republican Sen. Pat Roberts pushed the measure as an amendment to the bill that funds transportation projects across the nation.

#### ANWR alienates Senate Dems and moderate Republicans

By: Daniel Horowitz (Diary) | March 8th, 2011

http://www.redstate.com/dhorowitz3/2011/03/08/now-is-the-time-to-pass-an-anwr-bill/ Now is the Time to Pass an ANWR Bill It's time to launch a counter-offensive and end the Democrats' war on oil once and for all.

Yet, for the past 15 years, a truculent group of Democrats, along with a handful of liberal Republicans in the Senate, has prevented another ANWR bill from making its way to the president’s desk. Now, with Obama behind the desk, he has promised to block any effort to drill in ANWR, the Outer Continental Shelf, the Rockies, and much of the Gulf coast. It is high time that we issue a direct challenge to Obama and quell his war on energy independence and productivity.

#### Plan means breaking a democratic filibuster

Senator John Thune Dec 21 2005

<http://www.thune.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=4d5a2d02-f746-4caf-a047-2870e8e0bc95> Recent Press Releases Thune: Senate Democrats Block Vote on ANWR and $2 billion for LIHEAP Funding

Senator John Thune made the following statement today regarding the Senate Democrats’ filibuster against expanding oil production in Alaska, which would provide long-term funding for LIHEAP, as well as $2 billion for immediate LIHEAP funding: "Senate Democrats are obstructing an effort to pass legislation that provides America a chance to become less dependent on foreign sources of energy. This bill would not only open ANWR for oil exploration and drilling, but it would also provide a long-term funding stream for LIHEAP," said Thune. "With energy costs at an all-time high and families going cold because of the high cost of home heating oil, it is inexcusable for the Senate Democrats to play politics with this issue." In addition to providing vital funding for our troops and opening ANWR, the Fiscal Year 2006 Defense Appropriations bill also provides $2 billion for LIHEAP. The bill includes a provision to allow lease sales to produce 10.4 billion barrels of oil from the Artic National Wildlife Refuge and direct 5% of revenues from ANWR to provide the long-term funding for LIHEAP. "This winter’s freezing temperatures are putting an enormous strain on families and current LIHEAP funds, so it is irresponsible for Senate Democrats to obstruct an issue as important as this," said Thune. "By choosing to filibuster this needed legislation, Senate Democrats are leaving South Dakota’s low income families out in the cold. I urge my Senate colleagues to put cold and freezing families ahead of protests and politics."

#### ANWR Drilling faces resistance from Senate democrats

Laing ‘12

Keith Laing is a national political journalist who works for The Hill newspaper in Washington, D.C. At The Hill, Keith covers transportation policy in Congress and manages the paper’s Transportation Report blog. Prior to coming to The Hill, Keith worked for the News Service of Florida, where he tracked the Florida state legislature with a focus on transportation and energy issues. The Hill February 1, 2012 – lexis

House Republicans teed up an election-year battle over jobs Tuesday, announcing a $260 billion transportation bill designed to put Democrats on the defensive. The package from House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Chairman John Mica (R-Fla.) would spend $260 billion over five years on road and transit projects — funding that congressional Democrats and President Obama have long championed as stimulus for the economy. But the GOP bill would pay for some of the transportation work with an expansion of oil-and-gas drilling, including in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR), a nonstarter for many Democrats and their supporters in the environmental movement. Sensing an advantage, Mica on Tuesday warned Democrats that the bill is the only vehicle for highway funding that Republicans would support. “This is the only piece of legislation” that can pass the House, Mica said at a news conference in front of the Capitol. “This is a major start,” he said. “Look where we’ve been, and look where we are today.” Republicans also touted the bill as a job creator as they made the case that obstruction by Senate Democrats is standing in the way of legislation that would help the economy. “This bill will put Americans back to work rebuilding our roads and bridges and developing new sources of low-cost energy,” Mica said in a news release. “This legislation may be the most important jobs measure to pass Congress this year.” Transportation and business groups have been pushing Congress for years to approve a multiyear appropriations bill for transportation and infrastructure. The last such funding bill expired in 2009. But advocates Tuesday expressed reservations about Mica’s revised proposal. “Certainly we are happy the House and Senate are opening a discussion, but there’s a lot of work to be done,” said Edward Wytkind, president of the AFL-CIO’s transportation trades department. Wytkind lamented the vast differences between the version of the highway bill announced by Mica on Tuesday and the proposal that has begun moving in the Senate. In the past, “they have always moved these bills as ‘Big Four’ authorizations,” he said, referring to the chairmen and ranking members of the House Transportation and Infrastructure and the Senate Commerce, Science and Transportation committees. “They moved them as impenetrable, avoided ideological fights and increased the funding so that the next authorization would always be higher than the last one,” Wytkind said. The Senate’s version of the transportation bill is shorter, but it appropriates more money for road projects annually. The upper chamber has proposed spending $109 billion per year on the new highway bill, and its version of the legislation relies more on traditional sources of funding, such as the gas tax. Mica defended the highway bill as a team effort and told reporters to pack a lunch Thursday because he plans to allow amendments during the markup of the bill — a process that could drag on for days. “Everybody needs to find a way to fund these things,” Mica said. The plan to pay for highways with drilling has riled up environmental groups such as the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC). The New York-based group argued Tuesday that not only is linking highway spending to oil drilling bad for the environment, it also imperils the bill’s prospects for being approved by the Democratic-controlled Senate. “Instead of going the bipartisan route taken by the Senate, House Republican leaders have loaded the bill with environmental protection rollbacks, extreme measures that mandate oil drilling just about everywhere and a permit for the Keystone XL tar sands pipeline,” NRDC President Frances Beinecke said in a news release. “The American people need a transportation bill; this bill will prevent them from getting one.”

### Link - Env Lobby Backlash

#### Tying up environment regulation risks full scale backlash

http://www.eenews.net/tv/transcript/1599 Election 2012: ClearView's Book talks Obama win, impact on energy, environment policy with new Congress OnPoint Kevin Book, managing director at ClearView Energy Partners, November 07, 2012

Monica Trauzzi: So, Kevin, a late night. President Obama retaining the Presidency, the Republicans maintaining the House, and the Senate going to the Democrats. Does this mean the status quo on energy and environment policy, or did you see some sort of paradigm shift where we can expect things to change from how they've been the last four years? Kevin Book: Well, that's a, that's the kind of question that a mixed election outcome is going to bring a mixed answer. So here's your mixed answer. You have two years of a return to the regulatory agenda from 2009, which is to say that there's a lot of pent-up environmental energy, call it caged up, if you will, that is going to get released, because there's going to be lawsuits if it doesn't. So the regulatory agenda will be how energy policy moves until at least the midterm elections, and quite frankly, that regulatory policy is going to be left of center.

# CASE

## VENEZUELA

#### Brazil is stabilizing the region

David Granger, pub. date: 4-10-2008, staff writer, Stabroek News, “Security, stability and sovereignty in small Caribbean states,” accessed: 10-3-08, http://www.stabroeknews.com/features/security-stability-and-sovereignty-in-small-caribbean-states/

This has afforded Brazil the opportunity to play a stabilizing role in South America and the Caribbean. Brazil is positioned in the continent’s most strategic location having borders with all but two states. Its armed forces are the strongest on the continent and its stable economy has permitted it to increase military expenditure. It is in this new role that Brazil’s Minister of Defense Nelson Azevedo Jobim earlier this year visited Caracas, Georgetown, Paramaribo and other capitals to canvass support for the formation of the South American Defense Council. The proposed council is meant to develop a defense policy, resolve international disputes on this continent without resort to extra-continental mediators, act collectively on peacekeeping missions, and combat organized crime. This is a reassuring development for the states such as Guyana on the continent’s northern littoral. Smaller states can also look to Brazil to exercise a moderating influence on Venezuela which possesses the longest Caribbean coastline of 2,718 km and has longstanding geopolitical ambitions in the region. Venezuela’s claim to Bird Rock and to nearly one-third of the Caribbean Sea are potentially a disturbing factor in inter-state relations in the region, the attractiveness of the provisions of the Petrocaribe Energy Agreement and the Alternativa Bolivariana por las Americas (Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas) notwithstanding.

#### They cant get it from anyone else

John Mueller (Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies, Mershon Center, and is professor of Political Science, at Ohio State University) 2010 “Atomic Obsession: Nuclear Alarmism from Hiroshima to Al Qaeda” p. 163-5

One route a would-be atomic terrorist might take would be to be given or sold a bomb by a generous like-minded nuclear state for delivery abroad. This is highly improbable, however, because there would be too much risk, even for a country led by extremists, that the ultimate source of the weapon would be discovered. As one prominent analyst, Matthew Bunn, puts it, "A dictator or oligarch bent on maintaining power is highly unlikely to take the immense risk of transferring such a devastating capability to terrorists they cannot control, given the ever-present possibility that the material would be traced back to its origin." Important in this last consideration are deterrent safeguards afforded by "nuclear forensics;'

the rapidly developing science (and art) of connecting nuclear materials to their sources even after a bomb has been exploded.6 An indication of the natural sensitivity of governments on this issue can be found in the experience of the Pakistani journalist Hamid Mir. In an interview conducted as al-Qaeda's position in Afghanistan was about to be overrun, Osama bin Laden contended to Mir that al-Qaeda possessed chemical and nuclear weapons (this episode is assessed more fully in chapter 14). According to Mir, the Pakistani government told him "not to mention the nuclear weapon under any circumstance because the Americans might think Pakistan had sold it" to bin Laden.7 Although the Pakistanis appear to have gotten the point on their own, it was presumably hammered home a bit later in that year when CIA Director George Tenet flew to the country in part to inform Pakistan's president, with a notable absence of diplomatic subtlety, "You cannot imagine the outrage there would be in my country if it were learned that Pakistan is coddling scientists who are helping Bin Ladin acquire a nuclear weapon. Should such a device ever be used. the full fury of the American people would be focused on whoever helped al-Qa'ida in its cause."8 Moreover, there is a very considerable danger to the donor that the bomb (and its source) would be discovered even before delivery or that it would be exploded in a manner and on a target the donor would not approve-including on the donor itself. Another concern would be that the terrorist group might be infiltrated by foreign intelligence.9 It is also worth noting that, although nuclear weapons have been around now for well over half a century, no state, thus far at least, has ever given another state-even friendly allies-a nuclear weapon (or a chemical, biological, or radiological one either, for that matter) that the recipient could use independently, though there have been cases of state-to-state assistance with nuclear programs. For example, during the cold war, North Korea tried to acquire nuclear weapons from its close ally, China, and was firmly refused. 10 There could be some danger that terrorists would be aided by private (or semiprivate) profiteers, like the network established by Pakistani scientist A. Q. Khan. However, Khan's activities were easily penetrated by intelligence agencies (the CIA, it is very likely, had agents within the network), and the operation was abruptly closed down when it seemed to be the right time. And although the Khan case is understandably unsettling, it did not, as analyst Michael Levi notes, "involve nuclear weapons or explosive materials, the most sensitive part of the Pakistani nuclear program." Moreover, the aid he tendered was entirely to states with return addresses whose chief aim in possessing nuclear weapons would be to deter (or to gain prestige). As with previous examples of state-to-state assistance, Khan did not aid stateless terrorist groups whose goal presumably would be actually to set the weapons off. 11 In addition, al-Qaeda-the chief demon group and the only one that has claimed to see value in striking the United States-is unlikely to be trusted by just about anyone. As one observer has pointed out, the terrorist group's explicit enemies list includes not only Christians and Jews, but all Middle Eastern regimes; Muslims who don't share its views; most Western countries; the governments of India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Russia; most news organizations; the United Nations; and international NGOs. Most of the time it didn't get along aU that well even with its host in Afghanistan, the TaIiban government. And, although there is concern that a re-Talibanized Afghanistan would facilitate an al-Qaeda bomb program, the main TaIiban elements are strongly opposed to foreign fighters like al-Qaeda and have reportedly sought to distance themselves from the terrorist group, in part to ingratiate themselves with bin Laden's numberone enemy, Saudi Arabia, whose support they would need if they ever tried again to run Afghanistan.12